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EITC for All: A Universal Basic Income
Compromise Proposal
Benjamin M. Leff*
Abstract
Much has been written about a concept called universal basic
income (UBI). With a UBI, the government gives every person a
certain amount of money each year, or even each month. The UBI
has broad appeal with thinkers on both the right and the left, but
the appeal is partially because different thinkers have different
visions of what the current state of affairs is with respect to
government welfare policies and different theories about why these
existing policies are inadequate or damaging. Reforming existing
programs, rather than making a radical break with the past, could
satisfy at least some of the interests that motivate support for a UBI.
The purpose of this Article is to explore the possibility of modifying
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), the largest and arguably
most popular U.S. anti-poverty government transfer program, in
order to capture at least some of the benefits associated with the
UBI. This Article explores four problematic aspects of the EITC,
each of which could be modified to make it function more like a UBI.
These four aspects are: (1) the EITC creates disincentives to work
for the so-called “nearly poor” because the credit phases out at
moderately low income levels; (2) the EITC is fundamentally
dependent on family structure, which is potentially unfair,
invasive, and affects incentives to marry, divorce, and cohabitate;
(3) receipt of the EITC benefit is temporally mismatched with
recipient need, expensive for recipients to collect, and difficult for
the IRS to administer because the EITC is integrated with the tax
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system; and, finally, (4) the EITC is too small to fully function as a
hedge against underemployment and poverty. Modifying the EITC
would make it more like a UBI and would make it more effective at
achieving the goal of supporting financially struggling workers and
their families while minimizing perverse incentives.
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EITC FOR ALL
I. Introduction

Much has been written about a concept called universal basic
income (UBI). The basic definition of UBI is “a regular cash
income, paid to all, on an individual basis, without means test or
work requirement.”1 In other words, the government gives every
person some money every year, or even every month.2 UBI appeals
to thinkers on the political left, the political right, and places in
between.3 But, sometimes the broad appeal of UBI can be
attributed to the fact that different thinkers envision different
UBIs that solve different problems.4 That is partially because
different thinkers have different visions of what the current state
of affairs is with respect to government welfare policies and
different theories about why these existing policies are inadequate
or damaging.5 In fact, current income-support policies in the
United States are a pastiche of approaches, all of which are
simultaneously different from and similar to a UBI.6 Reforming
1. PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS & YANNICK VANDERBORGHT, BASIC INCOME: A
RADICAL PROPOSAL FOR A FREE SOCIETY AND SANE ECONOMY 1 (2017); see also
SIMON BIRNBAUM, BASIC INCOME RECONSIDERED: SOCIAL JUSTICE, LIBERALISM, AND
THE DEMANDS OF EQUALITY 3 (2012) (providing an alternative definition of UBI as
“an income unconditionally granted to all permanent members of society on an
individual basis, without any means test or work requirement”).
2. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 1 (explaining the basic
principle behind universal basic income).
3. See, e.g., Nathan Heller, Who Really Stands to Win from Universal Basic
Income?, NEW YORKER, July 2, 2018, at 65–66 (“Guaranteed income, reconceived
as basic income, is gaining support across the spectrum, from libertarians to labor
leaders.”).
4. See, e.g., ANNIE LOWREY, GIVE PEOPLE MONEY: THE SIMPLE IDEA TO SOLVE
INEQUALITY AND REVOLUTIONIZE OUR LIVES 130 (2018) (“[T]here is a pernicious
and nonsensical idea that a UBI would appeal to both sides, acting as a bipartisan
means that could be used for bipartisan ends. The idea of a UBI might be
bipartisan, but the ends and means would never end up pleasing both sides.”).
5. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 40–43 (explaining the
EITC and the social welfare programs enacted alongside it and discussing the
benefits and drawbacks). In the United States, the issue of different theories is
exacerbated by the fact that much of the writing about UBI, scholarly and
otherwise, is produced in countries with very different (and generally more
robust) welfare policies. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 7–9
(providing examples of European contributions to the idea of a universal basic
income).
6. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 40–43 (comparing and
contrasting EITC and UBI); see also LOWREY, supra note 4, at 184 (comparing the
amount of money spent on various social welfare programs with the money that
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existing programs, rather than making a radical break with the
past, could satisfy at least some of the interests that motivate
support for a UBI.7 The purpose of this Article is to explore the
possibility of modifying the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC),8 the
largest and arguably most popular U.S. anti-poverty government
transfer program, in order to capture some of the benefits
associated with a UBI.9
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a U.S. federal
income-support program that is politically popular.10 Proposals to
expand the EITC have become more common in recent years.11 One
former contender for the Democratic presidential nomination in
2020, Senator Kamala Harris, had proposed a new tax credit that
would function like a reformed EITC, even though it was described
as a supplement to the existing EITC rather than a reform of it.12
The EITC differs from a UBI in several respects, but as a broad
federally funded program that provides financial support to
low-income families and individuals, it also has many
commonalities.13 This Article seeks to explore four problematic
would be spend on a proposed UBI).
7. See LOWREY, supra note 4, at 7 (setting forth some of the benefits
supporters of the UBI recognize).
8. See SARAH HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., IT’S NOT LIKE I’M POOR: HOW
WORKING FAMILIES MAKE ENDS MEET IN A POST-WELFARE WORLD 24 (2015) (“The
EITC was designed to bring a minimum-wage worker and his or her family above
the official poverty line.”).
9. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 40–43 (explaining the
history of the EITC and those it would benefit).
10. See HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 4 (“President Reagan
proclaimed it ‘the best anti-poverty, the best pro-family, the best job creation
measure to come out of Congress.’”).
11. See Gene B. Sperling, A Tax Proposal That Could Lift Millions Out of
Poverty,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Oct.
17,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/eitc-for-all/542898/ (last
visited Oct. 23, 2019) (describing a Republican and Democratic consensus on
expanding the EITC to serve childless workers) [https://perma.cc/7QUG-Z495];
see, e.g., Grow American Incomes Now Act, H.R. 3757, 115th Cong. (2017)
(proposing an expansion of the EITC for working families).
12. See LIFT (Livable Incomes for Families Today) the Middle Class Act, S.
3712, 115th Cong. (2018) (proposing a cash payment for low- and middle-income
American households); see also Press Release, Kamala D. Harris, Harris Proposes
Bold Relief for Families Amid Rising Costs of Living (Oct. 18, 2018) (stating that
the Act would “provide middle class and working families with a tax credit of up
to $6000 a year—or up to $500 a month—to address the rising cost of living”).
13. See Andrew Flowers, What Would Happen if We Just Gave People
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aspects of the EITC, each of which could be modified to make it
function more like a UBI, and I would argue, better.14 Those four
aspects are: (1) the EITC creates disincentives to work for the
so-called “nearly poor” because the credit phases out at moderately
low income levels; (2) the EITC is fundamentally dependent on
Money,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Apr.
25,
2016),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/universal-basic-income/ (last visited Oct. 23,
2019) (“The original seed planted by [Milton] Friedman’s negative income tax idea
eventually
blossomed
into
the
Earned
Income
Tax
Credit.”)
[https://perma.cc/2LJS-SCEV]; see also Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Collision of Tax
and Welfare Politics: The Political History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, in
MAKING WORK PAY: THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICA’S
FAMILIES 15 (Bruce D. Meyer & Douglas Holtz-Eakin eds., 2002) (describing the
history of the EITC as a federal benefit for low-income working taxpayers);
Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Welfare by Any Other Name: Tax Transfers and the EITC,
56 AM. U. L. REV. 1261 (2007) (highlighting that qualification for EITC depends
upon an individual’s tax returns).
14. See discussion infra Part V (exploring solutions to the identified
problems of the EITC). Some versions of these problems (and others) have been
discussed in the literature on improving the EITC. See Anne L. Alstott, The
Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108
HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995) (discussing problematic aspects of the EITC); see also
MAKING WORK PAY: THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICA’S
FAMILIES 1 (Bruce D. Meyer & Douglas Holtz-Eakin, eds., 2002) (providing
research which discusses the EITC and its “noncompliance and marriage
penalties”); Anne L. Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, 73 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 285 (2010) (evaluating the significance and the history of the
EITC); Leslie Book et al., Insights from Behavioral Economic Can Improve
Administration of the EITC, 37 VA. TAX REV. 177 (2018) (arguing for more
taxpayer-centric policies to boost EITC compliance); Daniel P. Gitterman et al.,
Expanding the EITC for Single Workers and Couples without Children: Tax Relief
for All Low-Wage Workers, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 245, 245–46 (2008)
(“[E]xpansion of the EITC to childless single workers and married couples without
children deserves greater attention.”); Sara Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety
Net: A Study of Earned Income Tax Credit Recipients and a Proposal for Repair,
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 515, 522–23 (2013) (describing how the once a year payment of
the EITC does not provide adequate safety from financial shocks during the year);
Francine J. Lipman & Dawn Davis, Heal The Suffering Children: Fifty Years
after the Declaration of War on Poverty, 34 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 311, 322 (2014)
(“Child-related tax benefits have done much to relieve poverty, but they could be
more effective.”); Francine J. Lipman, Access to Tax InJustice, 40 PEPP. L. REV.
1173, 1186 (2013) (noting a number of the EITC’s “design challenges”); A M.
ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RES. & BROOKINGS INST., OPPORTUNITY,
RESPONSIBILITY, AND SECURITY: A CONSENSUS PLAN FOR REDUCING POVERTY AND
RESTORING THE AMERICAN DREAM 38 (2015) (arguing for removal of the child
dependence requirement as a way to “improve employment among disconnected
men”); STEVE HOLT, AM. ENTER. INST., THE ROLE OF THE IRS AS A SOCIAL BENEFIT
ADMINISTRATOR 1 (2016) (offering “strategies to improve the IRS’s role as benefit
administrator”);
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family structure, which is potentially unfair, invasive, and affects
incentives to marry, divorce, and cohabitate; (3) receipt of the EITC
benefit is temporally mismatched with recipient need, expensive
for recipients to collect, and difficult for the IRS to administer
because the EITC is integrated with the tax system; and, finally,
(4) the EITC is too small to fully function as a hedge against
underemployment and poverty.15 A reformed EITC that corrected
these four problems would, in each instance, move the program
closer to a UBI. It would also make the EITC program more
effective at achieving the goal of supporting financially struggling
workers and their families while minimizing perverse incentives.
At the same time, an expanded and modified EITC would still
bear one fundamental difference with a UBI: No money would be
provided unless a recipient works.16 I believe that a UBI without a
work requirement is superior to a modified EITC, but I
acknowledge that a significant barrier to political support for a
UBI comes from discomfort with a comprehensive program that
completely delinks income from work.17 That discomfort comes
from several very real sources.18 First, the moral connection
between income and work—while subject to numerous caveats—
runs deep in American culture.19 The idea that people who are able
15. See Lipman, supra note 14, at 1186 (identifying what she believes are
the four most pressing remaining problems with the EITC: “(1) complexity; (2)
high marginal tax rates in the EITC income phase-out ranges; (3) the marriage
penalty; and (4) minimal benefits for childless low-income workers and workers
outside of the age range and other statutory requirements”).
16. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1 (defining the universal
basic income as having no work requirement); see also HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL.,
supra note 8, at 24 (laying out that the EITC is supposed to help minimum-wage
workers, necessarily requiring a work component).
17. See Heller, supra note 3, at 65 (observing that there is apprehension
regarding the delinking of work and welfare).
18. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 99 (acknowledging
that universal basic income goes against widely held views that “it is unfair for
able-bodied people to live off the labor of others”) (quoting Jon Elster, Comment
on Van der Veen and Van Parijs, 15 THEORY & SOC’Y 709, 719 (1986)); see also
DAMON JONES & IOANA MARINESCU, THE LABOR MARKET IMPACTS OF UNIVERSAL
AND PERMANENT CASH TRANSFERS: EVIDENCE FROM THE ALASKA PERMANENT FUND
(2018) (using the Alaska Permanent Fund as a method for studying the impact of
a UBI on labor markets); BIRNBAUM, supra note 1 (addressing the philosophical
issues by a basic income that in effect de-couples work from income).
19. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 99 (acknowledging
that universal basic income goes against widely held views that “it is unfair for
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to work and support themselves would choose to stay home while
other workers are compelled by the state to support them seems
manifestly unjust to many, even to many philosophers.20 Second,
good empirical evidence about the effects of a substantial UBI on
labor participation rates is rare (although there are many current
projects seeking to gather good data).21 Observers may have
legitimate concerns that a UBI would create incentives for
low-income workers to stay home.22
A true UBI demands a delinking of income and labor.23 But,
because of significant popular and political opposition to this
delinking, it is worthwhile to explore mechanisms for getting at
least some of the benefits of a UBI without having to try to convince
skeptics of its most radical feature. Envisioning a modification of
the existing EITC to make it more like a UBI is at least one way to
do that.
This Article proceeds in four parts. First, I introduce the UBI.
Second, I explain how the current EITC works and introduce some
criticism of it. Third, I describe similarities between the EITC and
a UBI. And, fourth, I describe four proposed reforms of the EITC
to make it function more like a UBI and discuss some of the
trade-offs involved in substituting an expanded EITC for a full UBI
program.

able-bodied people to live off the labor of others”) (quoting Jon Elster, Comment
on Van der Veen and Van Parijs, 15 THEORY & SOC’Y 709, 719 (1986)).
20. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 9 (acknowledging that
universal basic income goes against widely held views that “it is unfair for
able-bodied people to live off the labor of others”) (quoting Jon Elster, Comment
on Van der Veen and Van Parijs, 15 THEORY AND SOC’Y 709, 719 (1986)); see also
BIRNBAUM, supra note 1 (addressing the philosophical issues by a basic income
that in effect decouples work from income); STUART WHITE, THE CIVIC MINIMUM:
ON THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP 3 (2003) (analyzing
the justness of a market economy under certain obligations related to economic
citizenship); Miranda Perry Fleischer & Daniel Hemel, Atlas Nods: The
Libertarian Case for Basic Income, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 1189, 1203–34 (providing
philosophical analysis and justification of a UBI).
21. See JONES & MARINESCU, supra note 18, at 2 (using the Alaska
Permanent Fund as a method for studying the impact of a UBI on labor markets).
22. See, e.g., VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 99 (laying out
the two main concerns that most opponents of the UBI express).
23. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 1 (explaining that
universal basic income does not require a work requirement, therefore delinking
it from income and labor).
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II. Universal Basic Income (“UBI”)

A universal basic income (“UBI”) is an old idea that has
recently seen increased attention and popularity around the
world.24 A simple definition of a UBI is that it is “a regular cash
income, paid to all, on an individual basis, without means test or
work requirement.”25 Not included in the definition, but important
nonetheless, is the idea that a basic income, at least one that is not
merely transitional, should be sufficient to make a significant
difference in the lives of poor recipients.26 Ideally, it should provide
at least a subsistence living to everyone in society.27 In effect, a
UBI is a fixed amount of cash that is paid to each member of society
regularly throughout the year, whether they work or not, and
whether they are poor or not.28 While the idea of a UBI seems
simple, it is often presented as a radical departure from current
governmental transfer programs, especially in a place like the
United States that is perceived to have a relatively restrictive
social safety net.29 In some ways, it is indeed both simple and
radical. But, each of the components of its definition is both more
complicated and less radical the more they are examined. I break
the UBI down into five primary components in this Section: (i) A
UBI has no work requirement; (ii) a UBI is not “means tested”;
(iii) a UBI is paid on an individual basis; (iv) a UBI is a cash
payment made at regular intervals throughout the year; and (v) a
UBI is large enough to make a significant difference in the lives of
the poor. This Article argues that the largest transfer program in
the United States, the EITC, could be modified to incorporate four

24. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 3, at 66 (“Recently, a resurrection has
occurred.”).
25. VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 1.
26. See Heller, supra note 3, at 65 (“In the U.S., its supporters generally
propose a figure somewhere around a thousand dollars a month: enough to live
on—somewhere in America, at least—but not nearly enough to live on well.”).
27. See Heller, supra note 3, at 65 (explaining what basic income should
consist of).
28. See Heller, supra note 3, at 65 (“A universal basic income, or U.B.I., is a
fixed income that every adult—rich or poor, working or idle—automatically
receives from government.”).
29. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 170–71 (providing poll
data from the United States indicating strong opposition to government welfare).

EITC FOR ALL

93

of these five elements. The very first component—the lack of work
requirement—is not proposed.
A. A UBI Has No Work Requirement
For many, the most radical definitional component of a UBI is
that, unlike most other social welfare transfer programs, it does
not distinguish between recipients based on their ability or
willingness to work.30 That is to say, it is provided on an equal
basis to recipients whether they work or not, even if non-work is a
choice.31 Most other forms of social welfare in the United States
(and elsewhere) at least attempt to particularize aid to specific
categories of “deserving” recipients.32 For example, the social
security system in the United States illustrates some of the ways
social welfare is often categorized.33 There are programs for the
elderly,34 the disabled,35 the temporarily unemployed,36 and the
spouses and children of deceased workers.37 In many cases, receipt
of benefits is conditional on a history of labor participation and
payment of social security taxes.38 Additional social programs are
largely directed at children, since children are inherently

30. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 99 (acknowledging
that universal basic income goes against widely held views that “it is unfair for
able-bodied people to live off the labor of others”) (quoting Jon Elster, Comment
on Van der Veen and Van Parijs, 15 THEORY & SOC’Y 709, 719 (1986)).
31. See Heller, supra note 3, at 65 (“A universal basic income, or U.B.I., is a
fixed income that every adult—rich or poor, working or idle—automatically
receives from government.”).
32. See John Kay, The Basics of Basic Income, 52 INTERECONOMICS 69, 69
(2017) (noting that “[a]ll established tax and benefit systems make use of both
contingent and income-related information” and providing examples).
33. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SECTION 218 TRAINING: INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL
SECURITY,
https://www.ssa.gov/section218training/basic_course_3.htm
(last
visited Oct. 23, 2019) (listing the social welfare programs that fall under the social
security program) [https://perma.cc/TA7H-9S7F].
34. See id. (listing retirement insurance as social security program).
35. See id. (listing disability insurance as a social security program).
36. See id. (listing unemployment insurance as a social security program).
37. See id. (listing survivors’ insurance as a social security program).
38. See id. (“Your work in Social Security covered employment helps you and
your family qualify for [social security] benefits. The benefit amounts are based
on the earnings reported to the Social Security Administration.”).
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“deserving” (and not expected to work), although their parents may
or may not be.39
Obviously, this impulse to separate “deserving” from
“undeserving” poor is, and has always been, fraught because of
social conceptions of inclusion and exclusion shaped by race and
other factors.40 For most non-elderly adults, whether they have
children or not, the most basic way U.S. social welfare policy has
distinguished between deserving and undeserving poor is to
attempt to assess potential recipients’ willingness to work.41
However, it is administratively complicated to assess an
individual’s willingness to work, since the question is necessarily
particular.42 Therefore, the biggest transfer program in the United
States, the EITC, uses a very simple metric to assess willingness
to work: The credit is calculated as a percentage of earned
income.43 If a potential recipient is unable to work in the market
economy, then she is denied all benefit. If she works, the benefit is
phased in based on how much she earns. The more she earns, up
to a ceiling, the more she gets. This simple metric obviously fails
to provide benefits to potential recipients who are unable to work,
either because they cannot find any paid job or because of disability
or other “legitimate” reason, but its strength is its administrative
simplicity.44 A UBI, on the other hand, eschews all attempts to
39. See id. (listing family and child welfare services as a social security
program).
40. See, e.g., LOWREY, supra note 4, at 138 (“Large swaths of the American
safety net and wealth-building programs were designed to exclude, punish, and
discipline the descendants of the country’s slaves.”)
41. See 45 C.F.R. § 261 (2019) (explaining the Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families Program—what used to be called “welfare”—has an elaborate
work requirement).
42. See id. (discussing the administrative steps that must be taken to
determine willingness to work).
43. See discussion infra Part III (“[T]he amount of credit received by very
low-income workers is entirely dependent on how much they earn. As they earn
money, they are eligible for the credit as a percentage of money earned, up to an
amount of income at which they are receiving the maximum credit.”).
44. A recent popular book is testament to the perceived importance of a work
requirement to gain popular and political support for a transfer program. Chris
Hughes, a founder of Facebook, argues passionately for what is in some respects
a universal basic income. But in his version, a recipient must show some kind of
work, either paid labor or certain kinds of unpaid non-market labor. See CHRIS
HUGHES, FAIR SHOT: RETHINKING INEQUALITY AND HOW WE EARN 94 (2018)
(discussing the work requirement).
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differentiate between recipients who need aid because they cannot
work and recipients who simply choose not to work.
In this Article, I make no attempt to resolve the fairness,
incentives, or administrability arguments about the value of a
work requirement.45 Instead, I present a universal transfer
program that maintains a work requirement—in other words, one
that is not a UBI. I do this simply to avoid one set of difficult issues
that accompany any discussion of a true UBI. I believe these
discussions are valuable and should not be avoided forever, but the
purpose of this Article is to propose a program that does not rise or
fall on the issue of willingness to work.
B. A UBI Has No Means Test
The second key aspect of a UBI is that it is not
“means-tested.”46 That means that no one is denied the transfer
because of their income or wealth.
It is sent out to all recipients on an equal basis.47 This feature
is often misunderstood, but it is arguably supported by arguments
about fairness, incentives, and, perhaps most importantly,
administrative simplicity. A UBI is often distinguished from
existing transfer programs by arguing that existing transfer
programs, because of means-testing, create what is sometimes
called a “poverty trap.”48 Often, traditional means-tested transfer
programs are described as follows: (i) Benefits are only available
to recipients whose income is below a certain threshold; (ii) once
the threshold is exceeded, the recipient ceases to qualify for the
45. See discussion infra Part V (setting forth proposals to make the EITC
more like a UBI and notably not discussing the arguments surrounding the work
requirement).
46. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 8 (stating that the
UBI is not based upon the wealth or income of those seeking the transfer). But
see discussion infra note 211 (pointing out that some UBI advocates, like Karl
Widerquist and Charles Murray propose UBI plans with phase-outs, apparently
not viewing a phase-out of benefits as inconsistent with the definition of a UBI).
47. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 14 (describing how a
basic income is paid in cash and unconditional in payment to each individual “at
a level independent of that individual’s household situation”).
48. See, e.g., VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 7 (“People are
entitled to continuing handouts on the condition that they remain destitute, and
can prove it is involuntary.”).
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transfer; (iii) therefore, means-testing creates a strong
disincentive for a potential recipient to climb out of poverty by
earning money, because earnings can disqualify the recipient for
the transfer.49 In its most extreme form, means-testing creates a
“cliff” effect, removing eligibility for transfers as soon as income
exceeds some fixed level.50 Almost as extreme as a cliff is a “soak
up” program, in which every dollar earned over the threshold
amount results in a loss of a dollar of benefit.51
While some traditional means-tested transfer programs may
have been designed that way at some point in time, very few still
are.52 Instead, eligibility for benefits generally phases out as
income rises.53 In a “phase-out” program, the quantity of transfer
for which a recipient is eligible decreases as income increases,
eventually reaching a point at which the recipient is no longer
eligible for any transfer.54 This phase-out structure still creates a
disincentive to earn whenever the recipient’s income places them
49. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 7 (describing the ways
in which a means-tested transfer can assist in creating a poverty trap for those
seeking to utilize the transfer).
50. See Van PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 18 (pointing out that
a means-tested transfer creates a line for which eligibility can be drawn ensuring
that those above a fixed level can no longer use the transfer).
51. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 19 (discussing the
implications of imposing a marginal tax rate of 100% on any income earned by
the poor, resulting in a poverty trap where one unit of benefit is retracted with
every unit earned); see also BIRNBAUM, supra note 1, at 12 (explaining that a
poverty trap is when “income support is reduced with the full amount of an
increase in one’s labor income”).
52. See GENE FALK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43634, TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE
FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF): ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFIT AMOUNTS IN STATE TANF
CASH ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 3–5 (2015) (explaining that the only significant
means-tested program in the United States is Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF), which has different eligibility rules for each state).
53. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Effective Marginal Tax Rates on Low-Income
Households, 84 TAX NOTES 1191, 1192–99 (1999) (discussing how a phase-out
system operates with regards to the income of those seeking the transfer).
54. See id. at 1191–92 (describing how a phase-out benefit correlated to an
income increase results in an “identical incentive and distributional effect” as
imposing a positive marginal income tax rate explicitly); see also ANNIE MILLER,
A BASIC INCOME HANDBOOK 81 (2017) (describing how phase-out ranges can often
effectively disincentivize people from utilizing them because of the ways in which
the earning disincentives can overlap). The U.K. recently tried to mitigate the
problem of multiple overlapping phase-outs by creating a Universal Credit, which
is reduced by a “Marginal Deduction Rate” (phase-out) of 65 or 76 percent,
depending on the income of the recipient. Id.
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in the “phase-out range.” When multiple benefit programs have
uncoordinated overlapping phase-out ranges, the earnings
disincentive can get very large, even potentially exceeding 100%.
That means that earning a dollar under such circumstances would
result in the worker losing more than a dollar in benefits, in that
case, it seems that the earnings disincentive is real and dramatic.55
However, much more often, phase-outs are more gradual,56 and the
incentive effect might be small. There is empirical uncertainty
about how the disincentive works at lower levels of income.57 When
phase-outs strongly affect incentives for low-income workers, they
are said to create a “poverty trap” (just as a cliff or soak-up would)
by discouraging workers from earning enough to climb out of
poverty.58
An ideal UBI solves this problem by removing the phase-out
of benefits, making the benefit available to all.59 For some,
removing means testing seems inefficient or unfair.60 Why should
the government give money to people who earn enough on their
own and do not need government assistance? After all, to the
degree to which the purpose of government transfer programs is to
assist the poor, targeting benefits at the poor seems like the most
55. See MALCOLM TORRY, MONEY FOR EVERYONE: WHY WE NEED A CITIZEN’S
INCOME xi (Bristol Univ. Press 2013) (explaining how marginal deduction rates
impact additional earnings); see also Guy Standing, Forward to MALCOLM TORRY,
MONEY FOR EVERYONE: WHY WE NEED A CITIZEN’S INCOME, at xxii (Bristol Univ.
Press 2013) (arguing means tests and behavior tests cannot overcome poverty
traps “whereby the precariat often pay a marginal tax rate of over 80 percent,
twice what the ‘middle class’ is expected to pay . . . [and] many end up paying
more than 100 per cent ‘tax’ on income gained in some precarious short-term
job.”).
56. See id. at 157 (explaining that many phase-outs are not as large of a
disincentive as they can be laid out to be and are rather much less drastic).
57. See discussion infra accompanying notes 218–223 (discussing the income
disincentives that can come with certain transfer programs especially for those in
lower income brackets).
58. See Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, supra note 14, at 549
(“For workers in the EITC phase-out range, the EITC creates an unambiguous
potential work disincentive.”).
59. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 28 (discussing the
ways basic income can help our economy and create “a way of living that is
sustainably generalizable.”).
60. See MILLER, supra note 54, at 81 (discussing how removing means testing
can create disincentives that make it less likely for people to take advantage of
the transfer credit).
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efficient policy. The answer is that a UBI is available to all to avoid
the disincentives associated with phasing it out. Many UBI
supporters also argue that a non-means-tested benefit is good
politically because it avoids distinguishing between low-income
people (who need assistance) and middle- and higher-income
people.61
As an added complication, it is often pointed out that it is
inappropriate to think about a UBI outside the context of any tax
used to fund it.62 Wherever there is an income tax, there is a
governmentally created disincentive to earn income. If income is
taxed at 10%, for example, the marginal benefit of earning a dollar
is reduced by 10%. This disincentive functions the way a phase-out
of a benefit program functions. There is the potential for confusion
in the terminology used to describe the difference between a phaseout and a general income tax, like the one described above. In the
example above, what distinguishes a phase-out and a tax is the
fact that the phase-out ceases affecting income once the benefit has
been entirely lost, while the tax continues as income grows. But it
is important to emphasize the similarity between the two. Both
function as a “marginal tax rate” on income: In the case of the
phase-out, the marginal tax rate is increased only when income is
within the phase-out range; in the case of the general tax, the
marginal tax rate is presumably increased consistently on all
income.63 Therefore, a phase-out increases the marginal tax rate
for relatively lower-income people, while the general tax increases
the marginal tax rate for higher-income people as well. A flat tax
combined with a basic income (usually called a demogrant in the
economic and tax literature) is “progressive” (and can be
dramatically so).64
61. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 54, at 79 (“[U]niversality means that
everyone is included, and by avoiding the division created by targeting, it could
lead to a more united, inclusive and harmonious society.”).
62. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 133 (discussing how a
personal income tax is the more straightforward tax to fulfill this obligation of
funding for universal basic income).
63. See Shaviro, supra note 53, at 1191 (defining “marginal tax rate” to be a
structure “which results from layering multiple income-conditioned transfer
phase-outs on top of various income-related taxes”).
64. See Ari Glogower & Clint Wallace, Shades of Basic Income 8–9 (N.Y.U.
70th Annual Conference on Labor; Ohio State Pub. Law Working Paper No. 443,
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3122146 (explaining
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Regressivity—which is when the marginal tax rate decreases
for higher-income taxpayers—is generally perceived to be unfair
and might create bad incentives.65 It might create bad incentives
because higher marginal rates among lower-earning people under
certain circumstances might create stronger disincentives for such
people to work than those that apply to higher-earning people,
creating unnecessary barriers to them working their way out of
poverty or near poverty. Thus, UBI supporters argue that a UBI—
even one funded exclusively by a flat or relatively flat income tax—
is both fairer and more efficient than a means-tested transfer
program, even in an otherwise moderately progressive income tax
system.66 Although the real lesson is that the fairness or efficiency
of means-testing can only be evaluated in the context of the
structure of the system that funds such a program.67
If a “surtax” was used to fund a UBI (or reformed EITC) and
to recapture benefits from recipients as their income rises, that
would be similar (or could be identical) to the UBI “phasing out,”
the traditional structure by which benefits are lost as income
rises.68 One potential difference between a “phase-out” and a
“surtax” relates to how each function is administered. On one
hand, if a benefits program operates outside of a taxing system, it
must have its own administrative system to administer it. This
administrative system must have the capacity to timely and
accurately collect information about each applicant’s income. On
the other hand, if a benefit program is universal, but the value of
the benefit is recaptured through a surtax, only the tax
the effect of a cash grant on the progressivity of an income tax)
[https://perma.cc/9SZV-A6F3].
65. But see Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for
Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952) (questioning whether an
income tax should be progressive as a way to achieve fairness).
66. See Glogower & Wallace, supra note 64, at 8–9 (illustrating how a basic
income grant is more progressive than an exemption for taxpayers).
67. See Daniel J. Hemel & Miranda Perry Fleischer, The Architecture of a
Basic Income, 86 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 8–9),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3346467 (describing the
interactions between a UBI phase-out and a progressive income tax)
[https://perma.cc/U324-HM5F].
68. See id. (manuscript at 8) (“[S]ome of the distinctions drawn between
different UBI variants—for example a UBI with a phase-out and a UBI that never
phases out—turn out to be alternative ways of accounting for the same flow of
funds.”).
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administration needs to collect that information (which,
presumably, it must do anyway). A surtax is therefore an
administrative simplification over a phase-out. To the degree in
which a benefit recipient could receive the benefit but fail to pay
the surtax owed (through fraud, error, or failure of the tax
administration), a surtax system might increase costs and result
in unfairness. The administrative distinction between a surtax
system and a phase-out system should not be ignored, nor confused
with the conceptual differences described above.
C. A UBI Is Paid on an Individual Basis
A third key aspect of a UBI is that it is provided on an
“individual” basis, as opposed to many traditional transfer
programs where benefits depend on aspects of family status. 69
First, in traditional benefits programs, marital status often affects
benefits, with married couples receiving less per capita than
unmarried individuals.70 Second, many programs provide more to
custodial parents of minor children than to recipients who do not
have custody of children.71 Each of these family-status conditions
creates complexity in the administration of the program, and
potentially creates unfairness and perverse incentives.
There
is
a
strong
justification
for
the
family-structure-conditional design of traditional transfer
programs. With respect to recipients who are “coupled,” it is argued
that a subsistence level of income is higher for people who live
alone than for people who share income with another adult because
of so-called household economies of scale.72 Attempts to identify an
69. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 14–16 (explaining that
a basic income is “individual” by definition).
70. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2019 POVERTY GUIDELINES
(2019), https://aspe.hhs.gov/2019-poverty-guidelines (last visited Oct. 23, 2019)
[hereinafter 2019 POVERTY GUIDELINES] (noting that in 2019 the poverty line for
a single person household was $12,490, but it was only $16,910 for a two-person
household) [https://perma.cc/3EXZ-AT3G].
71. See, e.g., FALK, supra note 52, at 1–2 (explaining that TANF is one of
several government benefits provided to poor families with children).
72. See Julie A. Nelson, Household Economies of Scale in
Consumption: Theory and Evidence, 56 ECONOMETRICA 1301, 1301–02 (1988)
(“[T]he notion that . . . the cost per person of maintaining a given material
standard of living may fall as household size rises, often arises in the literature
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official “poverty line” generally recognize this fact, with the poverty
line for a two-adult household being lower per person than the
poverty line for a single adult.73 To the degree to which a couple
with a $20,000 annual income shares expenses, they are effectively
“richer” than a person living alone with $10,000 annual income.74
Therefore, if the goal of a transfer program is to provide each
recipient with a comparable minimum standard of living, then
giving less per person to couples who share expenses makes sense.
But, of course, problems start immediately.75 First, a system
is needed to establish a way of identifying those people who share
expenses. In many programs, marriage is used as a proxy, which
is obviously problematic since unmarried persons sometimes
cohabitate and share expenses, and married persons sometimes do
not. Using a proxy that is both over and under inclusive creates
unfairness for those persons “misidentified” by the proxy. Perhaps
more importantly, reducing benefits for individuals who get
married may create disincentives to marry (or incentives to
divorce), which is often called a “marriage penalty.”76 Imagine that
two unmarried persons could cohabitate and share expenses, and
each get the full $10,000 benefit (because they are unmarried). If
they would receive a smaller per-person benefit if they married,
they have an incentive not to wed. A UBI avoids the perverse
incentives and potential unfairness of traditional transfer

on household composition.”).
73. See 2019 POVERTY GUIDELINES, supra note 70 (noting that the poverty
guidelines are sometimes loosely referred to as the “federal poverty level” (FPL),
“but that phrase is ambiguous and should be avoided, especially in situations
(e.g., legislative or administrative) where precision is important”).
74. See Nelson, supra note 72, at 1312 (“The variation in the sizes of the
estimated effects across goods suggests that economies of scale are very important
in the consumption of shelter, and substantially less important in the
consumption of clothing and transportation.”).
75. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 14–16 (analyzing the
different problems associated with providing basic income based on family
structure).
76. See The Tax Policy Center Briefing Book: A Citizens’ Guide to the Tax
System
and
Tax
Policy
Tax
Policy,
TAX
POL’Y
CTR.,
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-marriage-penalties-andbonuses (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (“A couple incurs a marriage penalty if the two
pay more income tax filing as a married couple than they would pay if they were
single and filed as individuals.”) [https://perma.cc/G8ST-5UCF].

102

26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 85 (2019)

payments, but at the cost of failing to take into account potential
savings from cohabitation.77
With respect to treatment of custodial children, the
justification comes from the observation that—if income is held
steady—a person who supports children is effectively “poorer” than
a person who does not. That follows from the simple observation
that children cost money.78 But again, conditioning the receipt of
transfers on the custody of children creates some administration
problems, incentive problems, and arguably fairness issues. Most
UBI supporters argue that the additional cost of children should
be addressed by granting each child his or her own UBI (though
one smaller than an adult) to reflect the marginal cost of raising a
child (and to affirm the personhood of children).79 In this case, the
only administrative issue is deciding which adult(s) should receive
the child’s UBI payment to spend on the child’s behalf.
D. A UBI Is a Regular Cash Income
Finally, a definitional criterion of a UBI is that it is “regular.”80
It can be paid every month or every week, but it should not be paid
as a lump sum at the end of the year, and it should not be paid only
once over a person’s life.81 The benefit of a regular payment is that
it can support a person through periods of unemployment or
underemployment without a savings requirement—that is, even if
a person fails to save for periods of low income, the UBI will be
available to at least provide for his or her subsistence.
77. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 54, at 68 (criticizing UBI schemes “because
individual assessment means that couples will receive twice as much as a
singleton, when they could manage on less than that”).
78. See Jacob Goldin & Zachary Liscow, Beyond Head of Household:
Rethinking Taxation of Single Parents, 71 TAX L. REV. 367, 391 (2018)(“[C]hildren
cost money to raise, including feeding, housing, and child care . . . .”).
79. See Should a Basic Income be Paid to Children?, BASIC INCOME EARTH
NETWORK https://basicincome.org/basic-income/faq/#children (last visited Oct. 23,
2019) (discussing a UBI for children) [https://perma.cc/7W63-BVCF].
80. See Robert C. Guth, Never Say Never: Ambitious State Tax Reform
Proposals to Watch in 2018, 27 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES 24, 46 n.31
(2018) (defining universal basic income as “income paid by a government, at a
uniform level and at regular intervals, to each adult member of society”).
81. See generally ANNE ALSTOTT & BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE STAKEHOLDER
SOCIETY (2000) (providing an example of a single-payment system).
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In addition to being regular, a UBI is provided in cash, not “in
kind.”82 Some welfare programs, like Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (food stamps),83 are provided “in kind,” out of
a concern that cash may be misused by its recipients or engender
fraud.84 A UBI is provided in cash under the assumption that
people are generally the best equipped to determine their own
needs, and therefore should be trusted with cash.85 Some argue
that recognizing recipients’ capacities to make their own choices
has dignitary value whether or not they maximize their benefits. 86
Cash is less expensive to administer than “in kind” benefits, so—
all else being equal—a cash benefit should be preferred.87 Insisting
that a UBI should be delivered in cash does not mean that it cannot
be delivered in an electronic form that is the equivalent of cash.
The UBI could be loaded onto debit cards, for example, or in any
other technologically appropriate mechanism.88

82. See About Basic Income, BASIC INCOME EARTH NETWORK,
https://basicincome.org/basic-income/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (“Cash payment:
It is paid in an appropriate medium of exchange, allowing those who receive it to
decide what they spend it on.”) [https://perma.cc/YEX8-YNLJ].
83. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC. (2019), https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/supplemental-nutrition-assistanceprogram-snap (last visited Oct. 23. 2019) [https://perma.cc/KB5S-SDLN].
84. See How FNS Fights SNAP Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC. (2019), https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/fraud (last visited Oct. 23, 2019)
(detailing SNAP’s fraud policies) [https://perma.cc/6MFN-GVGR].
85. See, e.g., VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 13 (arguing that
cash is superior to in-kind transfers as a means of “achieving greater freedom for
all”).
86. See Fleischer & Hemel, supra note 20, at 1234 (explaining why cash
transfers enhance “autonomy and self-ownership”).
87. See Michelle Miley, What Is the Difference Between Cash Transfers &
In-Kind Benefits?, THE NEST, https://budgeting.thenest.com/difference-betweencash-transfers-inkind-benefits-22791.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (noting that
when a government agency distributes food to the hungry, it expends time and
money, which “cash transfers don’t require”) [https://perma.cc/D9AG-3VHH].
88. See, e.g., What Is Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT)?, U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC. (July 13, 2018), https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/ebt (last visited Oct. 23,
2019) (“Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) is an electronic system that allows a
recipient to authorize transfer of their government benefits from a federal account
to a retailer account to pay for products received.”) [https://perma.cc/L99G-HV6Z].
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E. A UBI Is Large Enough to Have a Substantial Effect on the
Lives of the Poor
The final criterion is not always stated by UBI advocates (and
may not be universally accepted), but is nonetheless important to
most conceptions of a UBI: It should be large enough that it does
not leave many people in poverty.89 Even though UBI advocates
have very different conceptions of what problems a UBI should be
designed to solve, very few of them would be satisfied with a UBI
that left a substantial portion of the population in poverty. 90
Therefore, a UBI must be more substantial than current social
welfare and transfer programs.
III. The Earned Income Tax Credit
The Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”) is the largest
anti-poverty program in the United States, delivering $65 billion
in cash to low-income families.91 It is a “refundable” tax credit,
which means that it is integrated into the federal income tax
system, with applicants seeking the credit by submitting a tax
form with a special schedule attached, and the credit first being
used to decrease any income tax due, and then if any of the credit
remains, providing it to the applicant.92 The “refundable” nature of
the credit means that for many very low-income people, the EITC
is a net payment to the recipient from the federal government over

89. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 54, at 23 (stating that “an excellent
definition of a full Basic Income” is its “emphasis on universal, individual,
unconditional and high enough for the individual to live a life of dignity with the
opportunity to participate in public life”).
90. See Fleischer & Hemel, supra note 20, at 1259 (describing that, at
minimum, UBI should cover “food, clothing, shelter,” and possibly basic
healthcare).
91. See HOLT, supra note 14, at 1 (stating that that the EITC is the federal
government’s “largest—and most successful—antipoverty programs” delivering
65 billion dollars to 27 million eligible workers and families).
92. See Policy Basics: The Earned Income Tax Credit, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES (2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/policy-basicsthe-child-tax-credit (last visited Dec. 16, 2019) [hereinafter Policy Basics] (“The
amount of EITC depends on a recipient’s income, marital status, and number of
children.”) [https://perma.cc/9U5R-M5AV].
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and above any federal income taxes the recipient paid.93 Because
it often functions as a payment from the government, rather than
a reduction in income taxes due, it is a “transfer” program. The
EITC has five characteristics that are most important for our
current purposes:
(i) It is phased in (which makes it
“work-conditional”);
(ii) it is phased out (which makes it
“means-tested”); (iii) it is provided based on family status,
especially based on custody of minor children; (iv) it is delivered
through the tax system; and (v) it is insufficient to raise all
recipients out of poverty.94
A. The EITC Is Work-Conditioned
First, the EITC is “phased-in,” which means that the amount
of credit received by very low-income workers is entirely dependent
on how much they earn—if they earn nothing, they get nothing. 95
As workers earn money, they are eligible for the credit as a
percentage of money earned, up to an amount of income at which
they are receiving the maximum credit.96 For example, a worker
with three or more qualifying children receives a credit equal to
45% of earnings from the first dollar earned up to $14,290 of
earnings.97 If she earns $14,290, her credit is 45% of that amount,
which is $6431—the maximum credit.98 If she earns any less than
that, she gets a smaller credit. If she were to work twenty hours
per week for fifty weeks of the year doing a minimum wage job
($7.25 per hour), she would earn $7250, and so her credit would
93. See id. (describing the implication of the “refundable” nature of the EITC
program).
94. See id. (describing five important aspects of the EITC program).
95. See id. (“As the EITC phases in, it is calculated at a set percentage of
earnings called the ‘phase-in rate,’ which depends on marital status and number
of children.”).
96. See id. (noting that the EITC is designed to encourage and reward work,
and incentivize people to leave welfare for work and for low-wage workers to
increase their work hours).
97. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. § 3.05 (2018),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb18-10.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2019)
(announcing inflation adjusted numbers for 2018 tax returns, including EITC
Earned Income Amounts) [https://perma.cc/E9AJ-2424].
98. Id.
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only be $3262.50 (45% of her earnings in the phase-in range).99
Because of this “phase-in” structure, the EITC is work-conditioned,
but unlike other work-conditioned transfer programs, the EITC
only takes into account paid work.100 No credit is given either for
seeking work in good faith or for any kind of unpaid labor, whether
it is for one’s family or in the volunteer sector.101 Similarly, no
credit is given for people who are unable to earn, because of
disability or age, for example.
B. The EITC Is Means-Tested
Second, the EITC is “phased-out,” which means that the credit
is lost as a percentage of income after a worker reaches a certain
level of earned income (the “Income Eligibility Ceiling”).102 An
unmarried worker with three qualifying children starts losing the
credit when her income exceeds $18,660.103 After that, for each
dollar she earns, she loses 21.06 cents of credit.104 When she has
earned $49,194, she has completely lost the credit.105 This phaseout is the way that the EITC is “means tested,” and it makes any
potential recipient who earns more than $54,884 ineligible to
receive any credit.106 For most taxpayers, the credit is unavailable
99. Id.
100. See Policy Basics, supra note 92 (“As the EITC phases in, it is calculated
at a set percentage of earnings called the ‘phase-in rate,’ which depends on
marital status and number of children.”).
101. See, e.g., HUGHES, supra note 44, at 169 (proposing that anyone who has
a dependent under six or over 70-years-old should qualify for the benefit, since
they are doing unpaid household labor).
102. See Policy Basics, supra note 92 (“[T]he point where the EITC phase-out
begins, a household’s EITC amount decreases by a set percentage of income (the
‘phase-out rate’) until the EITC is reduced to zero, where the phase-out ends.”).
103. See
Rev.
Proc.
2018-18,
2018-10
I.R.B.
395
(2018),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb18-10.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2019) (showing
the same threshold amount for unmarried workers with one or two qualifying
children) [https://perma.cc/E9AJ-2424].
104. See id. (dividing the maximum amount of credit by the difference
between the threshold phase-out amount and the completed phase-out amount).
105. See id. (multiplying .2106 by $6431 and adding the threshold phase-out
amount of $18,660).
106. See id. (noting that the maximum income at which any taxpayer is
eligible for any credit is $54,884, which is the Income Eligibility Ceiling for a
married couple with three or more children).
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at much lower levels of income.107 For example, once a childless
person earns $15,270, he or she receives no credit.108 Taxpayers’
assets do not impact their eligibility for the EITC directly, but any
income from savings can have a dramatic effect. Rather than
phase-out the credit as investment income rises, there is a cliff at
$3500.109 Taxpayers whose investment income exceeds $3500 do
not qualify for the credit, no matter how much or little earned
income they have.110 If one’s investment income is below $3500, it
does not affect the calculation of the credit. As is discussed above,
this phase-out creates an additional effective marginal tax rate,
arguably creating a disincentive to earn additional income in the
phase-out range, just as the phase-in creates a negative marginal
tax rate (so to speak), increasing incentives to earn market income
in the phase-in range.
C. The EITC Is Based on Family Status (Not Individual)
Third, the EITC is expressly tied to family status, which
produces some complications around marriage and child
custody.111 First, even for couples without children, there is a
marriage penalty associated with the structure of the benefit.
Under certain circumstances, the aggregate benefit received by
two married people is smaller than the benefit received if they are
unmarried.112 For parents of a single child, the marriage penalty is
more dramatic: If one parent earns enough to lose all or some of
107. See id. (basing availability of credit on income levels for 2018 tax year).
108. See id. (providing information for 2018 tax year).
109. See id. (stating that the earned income tax credit is not allowed for
taxpayers who have investment income that exceeds $3500). This
investment-income cliff creates a strong disincentive to save enough in
income-producing investments to reach that limit. See Hemel & Fleischer, supra
note 67 (manuscript at 56) (pointing out that the 2018 EITC cliff relating to
investment income cliff of $3500 could create a marginal tax rate of 60,000% on
the 3,501st dollar of investment income).
110. Rev.
Proc.
2018-18,
2018-10
I.R.B.
395
(2018),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb18-10.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/E9AJ-2424].
111. See Policy Basics, supra note 92 (“The amount of EITC depends on a
recipient’s income, marital status, and number of children.”).
112. See Policy Basics, supra note 92 (comparing the phase-out rates for those
filing earned income taxes individually versus those married and filing jointly).
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the credit, then marriage disqualifies the other parent from
benefits as well, even if the other parent is the sole caregiver of a
child.113 If the parents are separated and file under “married filing
separately” status, then neither parent can claim the credit no
matter how little or much they earn, since that status disqualifies
parents from the EITC entirely.114 Second, because the benefit is
so much larger for the custodial parent of children, the structure
disincentivizes marriage for parents of multiple children,
especially for parents who have more than two children.115 The
increase in benefits with the first child is slightly larger than the
marginal increase with a second child, and much higher than the
marginal increase of adding a third child.116 After a parent has
three children, there is no additional benefit.117 This structure
creates an incentive for parents of multiple children to remain
unmarried and each claim at least one child.118 A married couple
with four children who each earn $18,000, for example, would
receive a credit of $3976.119 If that same couple were unmarried,
and each parent claimed two children, they would each receive a
113. See Caleb Smith & Michelle Lyon Drumbl, Understanding the Earned
Income Tax Credit, in EFFECTIVELY REPRESENTING YOUR CLIENT BEFORE THE IRS
§ 27.1.2.4 (Keith Fogg ed., 7th ed. 2018) (explaining how the marriage penalty is
more severe for some low-income married couples).
114. See id. (explaining the EITC implications of having a “married filing
separately” status).
115. See I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(A)(2018) (noting the special rule for divorced or
separated parents wherein a noncustodial parent can only claim deductions for
qualifying children under § 151 and a child tax credit); see also Smith & Drumbl,
supra note 113, § 27.2.3.2 (“[T]he custodial parent is able to use the qualifying
child for purposes of Head of Household filing status, EITC and the dependent
care credit . . . [while] [t]he non-custodial parent is able to use the qualifying child
for the dependency exemption and child tax credit.”).
116. See § 32(b)(1) (listing the tax credit percentages attributable to the
number of qualifying children).
117. See id. (applying tax credits to a max of 3 or more qualifying children).
118. See Smith & Drumbl, supra note 113, § 27.2.2.4 (“Absent divorce or legal
separation, . . . taxpayer[s] must file married filing separate (and [are] therefore
ineligible for the EITC) unless they are ‘considered unmarried’ under section
7703.”).
119. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. § 3.05 (2018),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb18-10.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2019)
(providing inflation-adjusted EITC amounts for 2018, from which one could
calculate that a married couple who earns $36,000 in the aggregate, earns the
maximum credit of $6431, but puts $11,650 of their income into the phase-out
range, reducing their credit by 2,453) [https://perma.cc/E9AJ-2424].
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credit of $5716, and between the two of them, they would receive
an aggregate credit of $11,432. In other words, because the couple
is married, they receive $7454 less credit than they would receive
if they were unmarried. This is true even if they cohabitate. These
and other family-structure issues create potentially perverse
incentives around marriage and cohabitation.
The EITC is structured so almost no benefit (never more than
a refund of a worker’s payroll tax obligation) goes to people who
are not the custodial parent of at least one child.120 Because almost
all other safety net programs are available to families with
children or the elderly or disabled, childless workers and parents
without primary care responsibility may fall through a hole in the
safety net.121 Non-custodial parents of children may still have very
real child support obligations, just like custodial parents, but no
ability to meet them because they do not qualify for
income-support programs.122
In addition to disincentivizing marriage and failing to serve
taxpayers who are non-custodial parents, basing EITC benefits on
family structure also complicates filing and enforcement. While
the IRS allows cohabitating unmarried parents to choose which
parent claims the child,123 this is not the case with parents who do
not cohabitate for at least half of the year.124 In other words, only
the parent who lives with the child for over half the year can claim

120. See Policy Basics, supra note 92 (“In contrast to the EITC for families
with children, the EITC for workers not raising children in the home remains
extremely small—too small even to fully offset federal taxes for workers at the
poverty line.”).
121. See Gitterman et al., supra note 14, at 249 (“[Single workers] are
generally ineligible for means-tested cash and medical assistance . . . such
assistance is limited to families with children, the elderly, and those with
disabilities”).
122. See Gitterman et al., supra note 14, at 249 (“Very low-wage,
non-custodial parents may find it difficult to meet their child support obligations
and survive economically, which can further marginalize their attachment to
legitimate work and to their children’s economic and psychological well-being.”).
123. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 596,
EARNED INCOME CREDIT (EIC) 14 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irsprior/p596--2017.pdf (noting the tax treatment of children by unmarried parents
in examples ten and eleven) [https://perma.cc/JD3G-BDJM].
124. See id. at 11 (requiring that a “qualifying child” live with you in the home
for more than half the year).
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the child for EITC purposes.125 This rule is further complicated by
the fact that parents who live apart are permitted to choose which
one claims a child for the purposes of the “dependency exemption,”
and the custodial parent files a form with the IRS to “release” the
child’s dependency exemption to the other parent. But this
“release” is not only ineffective for the purposes of the EITC, it is
often used by the IRS as evidence that the noncustodial parent
does not qualify for the EITC because they fail the residency
requirement.126 Taxpayers must be able to prove, and the IRS must
be able to assess, where a child actually lives for over half the
year.127 When parents share custody of a child or the child’s living
situation changes during the year, evidentiary problems can
prevent eligible taxpayers from receiving the credit.128 Further, the
very definition of a qualifying child is not consistent across various
tax provisions.129 In conclusion, the fact that administration of the
EITC is linked to family status and directed towards custodial
parents of children creates perverse incentives, limits the reach of
the EITC, and creates administrative and enforcement burdens.
D. The EITC Is Paid in a Lump Sum as a Tax Refund
Fourth, the EITC is integrated into the federal income tax
administrative system, which has implications about how it is
claimed and delivered. Filing a return is complicated, and so
claimants often hire paid preparers to help them file a return and
claim the refund.130 Compared to the way traditional welfare
125. See I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(C) (2018) (stating that the child must have lived with
the taxpayer in the United States for over half a year).
126. See Smith & Drumbl, supra note 113, at 12–13 (explaining how the IRS
uses the release for EITC purposes).
127. See IRM Exhibit 4.19.14-1 (providing a list of examples of acceptable
documentation for EITC claims, such as proof of citizenship and relationship
status).
128. See Smith & Drumbl, supra note 113, at 12–13 (“In close cases the
practitioner is forced to count the days, which apart from substantiation and
memory issues, is further complicated by the treatment of temporary absences.”).
129. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-558, FEDERAL
LOW-INCOME PROGRAMS: ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFITS DIFFER FOR SELECTED
PROGRAMS DUE TO COMPLEX AND VARIED RULES (2017) [hereinafter GAO-17-558]
(describing various low-income program eligibility requirements).
130. See, e.g., Leslie Book, Bureaucratic Oppression and the Tax System, 69
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benefits are usually claimed, this method shifts some of the cost of
receiving the benefit onto the claimant; however, some believe it
reduces stigma and makes claiming the benefit easier.131
Participation in the program among eligible claimants is estimated
to be significantly higher than among traditional welfare
programs.132 The most important fact about the way the refund is
delivered is that it is paid in a single lump sum several months
after the relevant year ends; therefore, it is not available to pay
bills at the time that it is most needed.133
E. The EITC Is Too Small to Eradicate Poverty
Finally, the EITC is too limited in amount.134 The maximum
credit that any family can receive under current law (2018) is
$6431 total for the year, for a taxpayer with three children.135 For
a childless taxpayer, the maximum credit in 2018 is $519 for the
year (less than $45 per month).136 In other words, compared to
other transfer programs, the credit is substantial for recipients
with children but is comparatively small for childless recipients (or
recipients who do not meet the qualifications for the credit).137 In
TAX LAW. 576, 576–77 (2016) (describing the administrative difficulties associated
with claiming the EITC); see also HOLT, supra note 14, at 4 (highlighting four of
the significant challenges associated with claiming the EITC).
131. See HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 193 (arguing that receiving
the EITC through the tax system reduces stigma).
132. See Book, supra note 130, at 572 (discussing the high participation rate
for the EITC).
133. See HOLT, supra note 14, at 4 (noting “[a] timing mismatch between when
benefits are needed in EITC-qualifying households and when they are made
available”); see also discussion infra Part IV.C (describing the debate between
scholars as to the advantages and disadvantages of the lump sum payment).
134. See Sharon Parrott, Commentary: The EITC Works Very Well—But It’s
Not a Safety Net by Itself, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Mar. 26, 2014),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-26-14tax-commentary.pdf
(last visited Dec. 16, 2019) (noting that the EITC itself is not enough income
assistance to keep people out of deep poverty) [https://perma.cc/6D9Q-FA9Q].
135. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. § 3.05 (2018),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb18-10.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2019)
(providing inflation-adjusted EITC maximum credit amounts for families who
have multiple children) [https://perma.cc/E9AJ-2424].
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Gitterman et al., supra note 14, at 258 (comparing maximum
benefit amounts for recipients with no qualifying children, one qualifying child,
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fact, the credit for childless workers is expressly tied to payroll
taxes, refunding the half of payroll taxes that are paid by employed
persons.138 If a person is self-employed (or a contractor), she is
responsible for both halves of her payroll tax obligation so that the
EITC will never do more than refund half of the payroll taxes she
owes.139 As a result, for workers without custody of minor children,
the EITC functions as a small tax refund, not a transfer
program.140
Because the EITC is so much more substantial for recipients
with children, it really functions much more like a supplement to
the child tax credit, providing tax relief and transfers to parents.141
But even as a transfer program for recipients with children, the
credit leaves many families in poverty.142 Even with the maximum
credit for a family with three children ($6431 in 2018),143 this
amount is not enough to bring a family out of poverty ($25,750 for
a family of four)—even when added to the wage a parent would
earn if working minimum wage ($7.25) for 2000 hours ($14,500). 144
F. Illustrative Examples
To illustrate these five components of the EITC program, it
might be useful to think about two families, the Smiths and the
Joneses. The Smiths consist of Ashley Smith and her three

and two or more qualifying children).
138. See I.R.C. § 32(b)(1) (2018) (noting that the credit percentage for
taxpayers with no qualifying children is 7.65%).
139. See id. (describing the applicability of the EITC to non-custodial
parents).
140. See, e.g., Gitterman et al., supra note 14, at 247 (“Currently, there is only
a small EITC for single workers between the ages of 25 and 64 who are not raising
children.”).
141. See I.R.C. §§ 24(a), 24(h)(2) (2018) (stating that a credit of $2000 per child
is available to workers in a broad range of incomes).
142. See Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, supra note 14, at 300
(concluding that the EITC still leaves many families in poverty).
143. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. § 3.05 (2018),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb18-10.pdf (stating the EITC maximum
amount for a family with three children) [https://perma.cc/E9AJ-2424].
144. See 2019 POVERTY GUIDELINES, supra note 70 (detailing the number of
persons in a family or household and the corresponding poverty level that would
qualify the household for subsidies and benefits).
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children, Sophia (9), Ethan (7), and Emma (5). The Joneses, alas,
consists solely of Ms. Smith’s ex-husband, Michael Jones.
The impact of the EITC on Mr. Jones is unlikely to be large.
He is eligible for almost eight cents for every dollar he earns up to
$6780.145 If he has a minimum-wage job, he will earn this amount
once he works 935 hours over the course of the year, which
qualifies him for the maximum credit of $519.146 Unfortunately, if
he is an employee for all those hours, he will owe that amount in
payroll taxes, which will be withheld from his paychecks by his
employer(s).147 If he is self-employed, or employed as a contractor
rather than an employee, he will owe twice the amount of the credit
as self-employment taxes.148 So, the credit will only have the effect
of offsetting or partially offsetting his federal tax obligations, even
at the lowest levels of income.
Once he manages to work 1171 hours at minimum wage, the
credit will start acting as a disincentive to work. At the federal
minimum wage of $7.25, Mr. Jones will earn $8490 when he works
1171 hours—the EITC for a worker with no qualifying children
begins to phase out at $8490 (in 2018).149 For every dollar he earns
now, almost eight cents of credit will be lost. That loss of credit
compounds his payroll tax or self-employment tax obligations, so
that he will lose almost twenty-three cents for every dollar he
earns, even before calculating any federal (or state) income tax
that he might owe. Mr. Jones’s payroll taxes will be withheld
throughout the year (or if he is self-employed, he will be required
to make estimated payments periodically), but his EITC payment

145. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. § 3.05 (providing
inflation-adjusted EITC amounts for an unmarried individual who does not have
custody of children).
146. See id. (providing the earned income credit and phase-out amount for
eligible individuals).
147. See I.R.C. § 3101 (2018) (stating the payroll tax rate); see also id. § 3102
(stating that employers are required to collect payroll taxes on behalf of
employees); id. § 32(b)(1) (stating that the EITC rate for taxpayers with no
children is 7.65%).
148. See id. § 1401 (stating the self-employment tax rate); see also id.
§ 32(b)(1) (stating the EITC rate for taxpayers with no children is 7.65%).
149. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. § 3.05 (2018),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb18-10.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2019)
(announcing EITC Phase-Out Thresholds for 2018) [https://perma.cc/E9AJ-2424].

114

26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 85 (2019)

will be made in one lump sum in the first half of the year following
the year he qualifies for it.150
If Mr. Jones is like the majority of other claimants, he will
have to hire someone to do his tax returns to claim the credit and
will likely pay them for this service.151 He might even pay extra to
receive a refund-anticipation loan, and his net EITC payment will
then be even smaller.152 Because Mr. Jones is not the custodial
parent of his children, he will not receive any EITC on their
account, but he may still have an obligation to pay child support to
his former spouse. Financial support obligations are not part of the
EITC calculus and an unmarried person without custodial children
is treated the same as an unmarried person with no children to
support at all. 153
For Ms. Smith, the credit operates differently and will
probably have a bigger impact on her than on Mr. Jones. If she
doesn’t manage to find any paid work in 2018, the EITC will not
help her at all.154 But if she can find paid work, the EITC will pay
her forty-five cents for every dollar she earns up to $14,290,
subsidizing the first 1971 hours of work at minimum wage; her
phase-out would not begin until she earns $18,660 (2574 hours at
minimum wage).155 The subsidy will not be enough to bring her
family out of poverty until her market earnings are substantial,
150. See infra Part IV.C (describing the debate between scholars as to the
advantages and disadvantages of the lump sum payment).
151. See HOLT, supra note 14, at 5 (“A majority of EITC filers use commercial
for-profit tax preparers, and these can be expensive.”).
152. See Brett Theodos et al., Urban Inst. Characteristics of Users of Refund
Anticipation Loans and Refund Anticipation Checks, U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., 1, 3
(2010)
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/financialeducation/Documents/Characteristics%20of%20Users%20of%20Refund%20Antic
ipation%20Loans%20and%20Refund%20Anticipation%20Checks.pdf (last visited
Dec. 16, 2019) (detailing that refund anticipation loans are bank made loans that
allow taxpayers to receive advances on their tax refunds from the IRS)
[https://perma.cc/MXG7-YYU4].
153. See Policy Basics, supra note 92 (“Under current law, a childless adult or
noncustodial parent working full-time, year-round at the federal minimum wage
is ineligible for the EITC.”).
154. See I.R.C. § 32(a)(1) (2018) (noting that the credit applies to earned
income).
155. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. § 3.05 (2018),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb18-10.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2019)
(providing the EITC Earned Income Amount and Phase-Out Thresholds for 2018)
[https://perma.cc/E9AJ-2424].
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but a 45% subsidy is likely to have significant effects on her life
and the lives of her children. On the other hand, because the
subsidy is significant for her, the phase-out might have a more
significant disincentive effect on her labor choices than on those of
Mr. Jones. For example, if Ms. Smith managed to get a job that
paid ten dollars an hour and she was working 1900 hours per year,
the phase-out would impact any additional work she performed,
reducing her take-home pay by twenty-one cents for every dollar
she earned (again, in addition to the payroll or self-employment
taxes, which would reduce her pay by 7.65% or 15.3%
respectively).156 Like Mr. Jones, Ms. Smith will not receive her
EITC payment until months after the year is over, she will also
likely pay someone to obtain them for her, and she may pay extra
for a loan against the payment. If Ms. Smith receives child support
payments from Mr. Jones, it will not be considered “earned”
income, and so cannot increase or reduce the amount of her
credit.157
Finally, the way the credit is structured around family
composition may have important implications for Ms. Smith’s
domestic choices. First, if she were married to Mr. Jones, the two
of them together could never receive more than the maximum
credit of $6431, and so, in effect, Mr. Jones would lose his
(relatively minor) credit.158 More importantly, their income would
be aggregated for the purposes of the credit, so if both worked
minimum wage jobs, their credit would start phasing out when the
two of them reached an aggregate of 3358 hours of paid work (1679
each).159 Because of that, the phase-out “poverty trap” affects
156. See Policy Basics, supra note 92 (applying the provided phase-out rate of
21.06%, to the annual income of a single unmarried parent of three children); see
also I.R.C. § 32(b)(1) (2018) (providing the payroll tax and self-employment tax
rates).
157. See What Is Earned Income?, IRS (2019), https://www.irs.gov/creditsdeductions/individuals/earned-income-tax-credit/earned-income (last visited Oct.
23, 2019) (providing examples of income that are not earned income)
[https://perma.cc/N4LG-QTFT].
158. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. § 3.05 (2018),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb18-10.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2019)
(providing the maximum credit for a married couple filing jointly)
[https://perma.cc/E9AJ-2424].
159. See id. (providing EITC Earned Income Amount and Phase-Out
Thresholds for 2018).
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married workers at far lower levels of work than unmarried
parents of custodial children.160 Perhaps even more importantly, if
they were married and filed separately (which they might do if
they were separated and Ms. Smith wanted to keep her finances
separate), neither could claim any credit at all.161
Thus, the EITC is a quite successful program for
supplementing the earned income of low-wage workers, but it
provides no benefit for people who can’t earn income, creates a
disincentive to earn for low and middle-income workers who are
climbing out of poverty, distorts some choices about family
structure, is delivered in a way that fails to maximize the benefit
to its recipients, is mainly effective for parents with qualifying
children, and is not large enough to guarantee that its recipients
will not still be below the official poverty line. That is to say, it is
work-conditional, means-tested, based on family-status,
administered through the income-tax system, and moderate in
overall amount. In its present form, the EITC appears to be quite
different from a UBI. However, the next section discusses some
ways that the EITC is actually closer to a UBI than other benefit
programs.162 Finally, the last section discusses proposed reforms of
the EITC that make it even more like a UBI.163 Most of these
reforms have been proposed for many years by critics without tying
them in any way to the concept of UBI.164
IV. Similarities Between a UBI and the EITC
As described above, there are profound differences between a
UBI and the EITC.165 But when the EITC is compared to other
more traditional anti-poverty programs, it becomes clear that the
EITC already has some significant similarities to a UBI. These
similarities are, at least arguably, significant contributors to the
160. See Policy Basics, supra note 92 (showing phase-out amounts for both
single and married individuals).
161. See Smith & Drumbl, supra note 113, at 8 (“Married taxpayers cannot
claim the EITC if using the married filing separately filing status.”).
162. Infra Part IV.
163. Infra Part V.
164. See infra Part V.
165. See supra Parts II–III (discussing various aspects of the UBI and EITC).

117

EITC FOR ALL

EITC’s successes.166 Political and scholarly commentators strongly
emphasize the differences between “traditional welfare” programs
and the EITC,167 and UBI enthusiasts distinguish a UBI from
existing government anti-poverty programs in similar ways.168 For
example, (i) like a UBI, the EITC is paid in cash not in-kind; (ii)
like a UBI, the EITC has relatively few conditions, and those
conditions are relatively easy for a bureaucracy to assess,
decreasing administrative costs; (iii) like a UBI, the EITC is
perceived to be less stigmatizing to recipients than “traditional
welfare”; and (iv) the EITC’s phase-out is gradual enough that it
probably creates very little disincentive to work.169
A. EITC Is Paid in Cash
The most obvious similarity between a UBI and the EITC is
the EITC is paid in cash, with no constraints on how the recipient
spends it.170 This may seem like a simple thing, but it is actually
quite different from the other largest transfer programs in the
United States and is somewhat controversial. For example,
arguably the largest anti-poverty program in the U.S. is Medicaid,
which provides medical insurance to low-income U.S. residents. 171
Obviously, medical insurance is an in-kind benefit, and recipients
who believe that they would be better off using the cost of those
benefits for something other than medical insurance are unable to
do so. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”),
usually called “food stamps,” is the second largest anti-poverty
program in the United States, with 45.8 million recipient

166. See generally infra Parts IV.A–D (discussing the characteristics the UBI
and EITC share).
167. See HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 6 (“It would be wrong to call
the EITC the new welfare—it is unlike welfare in nearly every way one could
imagine.”).
168. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 69.
169. See infra Parts IV.A–D.
170. See GAO-17-558, supra note 129, at 6 (describing the EITC as “cash
assistance”).
171. See GAO-17-558, supra note 129, at 6 (reporting that an estimated 68.9
million people were enrolled in Medicaid in 2015 at a total expenditure of
approximately $330 billion).
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families.172 A recipient of “food stamps” receives a debit card that
can be used only at participating merchants and only for qualifying
products.173 For example, the debit card cannot be used to buy hot
foods, foods intended to be consumed on the premises, or nonfood
items like toilet paper or cleaning supplies.174 In addition, because
the card must be used with participating vendors, it cannot be used
to purchase eggs or vegetables from a neighbor who raises or grows
them.175
For some UBI and EITC supporters, the difference between
“in-kind” and “cash” benefits is important.176 For example,
libertarians like Charles Murray argue that “[t]he limited
competence of government is inherent,” and therefore distributing
cash is inherently better than distributing governmentally
selected benefits.177 The EITC—like a UBI and unlike an in-kind
benefits program such as SNAP or Medicaid —is an unconditional
cash transfer.178 It can be used for whatever the recipient thinks
would benefit them the most. It can even be used to pay the fees
that tax preparers charge for claiming it.179 Recipients of the EITC
report strong perceived benefits of receiving money with which
they can do whatever they want.180 Some purposely spend it on
172. See GAO-17-558, supra note 129, at 4 (comparing the largest
anti--poverty programs in the United States by number of recipients).
173. See Facts About SNAP, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Aug. 14, 2019),
https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/facts (last visited Sept. 14, 2019) (detailing the
process for using an Electronic Benefits Transfer card under the SNAP program)
[https://perma.cc/9GMD-S233].
174. See id. (listing the various foods that may not be purchased with SNAP
benefits).
175. See id. (describing the process for using SNAP benefits via a connected
point-of-sale terminal).
176. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 13 (arguing that cash
is better than in-kind benefits because it creates administrative simplicity,
eliminates pressures from lobbyists, and promotes individual choice).
177. CHARLES MURRAY, IN OUR HANDS: A PLAN TO REPLACE THE WELFARE
STATE 92 (rev. ed. 2016).
178. See GAO-17-558, supra note 129, at 4 (identifying the types of benefits
offered by the largest government anti-poverty programs).
179. See GAO-17-558, supra note 129, at 4 (identifying “cash assistance” as
the benefit derived from the EITC).
180. See HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 15–16 (discussing various
ways in which individuals have benefited from of the EITC’s lack of in-kind
restrictions).
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things that may seem to some observers to be frivolous
expenditures.181 They take their children to Disney World,182 for
example, or they might have a lavish Christmas feast with
wrapped presents and a costly tree.183 Most, however, use it to pay
down debt and save at least some for future income shocks,
something that one cannot do with in-kind or highly restricted
benefits.184 Again, the fact that the EITC is an unconditional cash
grant, like a UBI, means that recipients can do with it what they
want, and that enhances their liberty and arguably their
self-esteem. Some scholars argue that it can contribute to a mental
shift that may actually have a significant effect on the climb out of
poverty.185
So, the fact that the EITC, just like a UBI, is paid in cash
means that it has the same philosophical benefits of promoting
liberty and autonomy. Similarly, cash payments under an EITC
have the same economic benefit of permitting people to spend the
money on whatever they think is best, which is more efficient to
the degree that people generally make the best choices about how
to use resources for their own happiness.

181. See Planet Money, Episode 451: Why Some People Love Tax Day, NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO
(Apr.
12,
2013,
9:30
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2013/04/12/177063399/episode-451-whysome-people-love-tax-day (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (discussing how one EITC
beneficiary spent part of her credit on a trip to Disney World for her son)
[https://perma.cc/ZNZ6-SFR5].
182. Id.
183. See HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 187 (“Most years, she has
taken out a $1000 loan—an advance on the refund—in December, which covers
Christmas gifts, but she has had to pay roughly $400 in interest and fees for the
privilege; both are taken from her tax refund.”).
184. See HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 187 (“Nearly four in ten
refund dollars are invested—used for purposes households associate with upward
mobility—or saved.”);
Jessica Dickler & Sharon Epperson, Here’s What
Americans
Do
with
Their
Tax
Refunds,
CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/01/heres-what-americans-will-do-with-their-taxrefunds.html (last updated Mar. 31, 2019) (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (discussing
the results of a survey that asks what Americans do with the proceeds of their tax
refunds) [https://perma.cc/9LA3-24C4].
185. See HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 19 (“In sum, the EITC
seems to inspire future-oriented goals. And to some extent, it also seems to
prompt the financially responsible behavior—thrift and debt payoff—that could
lead to their fulfillment.”).
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B. EITC Is Administratively Simple

Another similarity between the EITC and a UBI is that it is
comparatively much simpler to administer than traditional
welfare programs. The EITC is claimed by submitting a regular
tax return to the IRS with a schedule attached.186 Other than the
representations made on the form, no other supporting material is
required.187 The form is then administered by the IRS, which
already has the burden of collecting almost all the information on
the schedule in order to administer the tax laws.188 Traditional
welfare benefits require much more elaborate reporting, often
involving face-to-face meetings between case workers and
recipients.189 The relative simplicity of the EITC’s administration
results in much lower administrative costs for the program.190 For
example, the EITC’s program costs are estimated to be between 1
and 1.85% of the benefits distributed, whereas the program costs
in the food stamps program are estimated to be closer to 20 to 25%
of benefits distributed.191 The low administrative barriers also
results in higher participation rates among eligible potential
recipients.192 Again, EITC participation is estimated at 89%,
compared to a participation rate for food stamps that is about
70%.193 Anecdotal evidence supports the view that traditional
186. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2016 PUB. NO.
596, EARNED INCOME CREDIT (EIC) 18 (2016) (detailing the process for filing an
EITC with a regular tax return).
187. See id. at 18–19 (detailing the process for filing an EITC with a regular
tax return).
188. Id.
189. See Ventry, Welfare by Any Other Name, supra note 13, at 1264
(describing the administrative simplicity of the EITC, relative to other social
welfare programs).
190. See Ventry, Welfare by Any Other Name, supra note 13, at 1265 (“The
sum total of [the EITC’s] administrative benefits results in lower costs and higher
participation rates relative to direct transfer programs.”).
191. See Ventry, Welfare by Any Other Name, supra note 13, at 1265 (“The
sum total of [the EITC’s] administrative benefits results in lower costs and higher
participation rates relative to direct transfer programs.”).
192. See Ventry, Welfare by Any Other Name, supra note 13, at 1265
(comparing a participation rate of up to 89% for the EITC with a rate closer to
70% for the Food Stamps program).
193. See Ventry, Welfare by Any Other Name, supra note 13, at 1265
(comparing a participation rate of up to 89% for the EITC with a rate closer to
70% for the Food Stamps program).
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anti-poverty programs can be complex enough that potential
recipients are unable to make use of them, and that the EITC
solves at least some of those problems. For example, Annie Lowrey
reports the experience of one food stamps recipient who reported,
“I lost food stamps three or four times because I couldn’t get the
paperwork, or couldn’t call the right number. I did everything I
was supposed to do.”194 The EITC, even though it is
computationally complex and has some frustrating qualification
rules that exclude some recipients, is much easier to claim, largely
because the fact that it is a part of a regular tax form means that
commercial tax-preparation firms make the claim for most
recipients, for a fee of course.195 Even without any reform, this
structure makes the benefit easier to claim than traditional
anti-poverty programs. A UBI would likely be even simpler to
administer, because its universality means that there are almost
no qualifications to assess. But the administrative simplicity of the
EITC is more like a UBI than traditional welfare programs.
C. EITC Is Not Experienced as Stigmatizing
One of the claims most powerfully made by UBI supporters is
that traditional anti-poverty programs are experienced as
stigmatizing to their recipients.196 For example, in the introduction
of their popular book, Philippe Van Parijs and Yannick
Vanderborght link traditional anti-poverty programs to
humiliation of their recipients.197 Annie Lowrey points out how
racialized the discourse around antipoverty programs is in the
United States, arguing that “[l]arge swaths of the American safety
net and wealth-building programs were designed to exclude,
194. LOWREY, supra note 4, at 114–15.
195. Cf. Ventry, Welfare by Any Other Name, supra note 13, at 1264 & n.12
(discussing benefits that result from administering social-welfare programs
through the tax code).
196. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 7 (“[D]ue to their
conditionality, [traditional anti-poverty programs] have an intrinsic tendency to
turn their beneficiaries into a class of permanent welfare claimants.”).
197. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 7 (“People are entitled
to continuing handouts on the condition that they remain destitute, and can prove
it is involuntary. They are also subjected to more or less intrusive and humiliating
procedures.”).
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punish, and discipline the descendants of the country’s slaves.” 198
To the degree to which the administration of or the rhetoric around
traditional anti-poverty programs are experienced as stigmatizing
or racist, they may have a profound negative impact on their
recipients.
The EITC, on the other hand, again because it is folded into
the tax system, requires no special application process or
encounters
with
benefits
administrators.199
Sarah
Halpern-Meekin and her co-authors, who conducted an in-depth
study of 115 families who received the EITC, report that their
subjects had a much more positive experience of claiming and
collecting their EITC check.200 She argues that, “[c]laiming
benefits through the tax system is a much less stigmatized and
socially isolating experience than waiting in line at the welfare
office. Working families can get help without paying a social and
psychological price.”201 To the degree to which a UBI is intended to
reduce the social stigma associated with anti-poverty programs, it
is possible that the EITC has already accomplished a significant
portion of that goal. Additional reforms may make it even less
stigmatizing.

198. LOWREY, supra note 4, at 138; see generally MARTIN GILENS, WHY
AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY
POLICY (John Tryneski ed., 1999) (discussing the American public’s complicated
views on welfare).
199. See Ventry, Welfare by Any Other Name, supra note 13, at 1264 (“In the
case of the EITC, would-be tax-transfer claimants self-declare eligibility simply
by filing a tax return.”).
200. See HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 20
No welfare bureaucrats are controlling their lives. The working poor
can exercise autonomy and spend that gloriously large lump sum
however they please. When they arrive at that H&R Block office to
collect their refund check, their status as beneficiaries of a cash
assistance program is invisible. They are there because they filed their
taxes just like every other hardworking American. Some evidence
suggests that an enhanced sense of social inclusion might lead to other
forms of prosocial behavior, such as political and civic engagement.
201. HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 193.
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D. The EITC’s Phase-Out Is More Gradual than Most
Means-Tested Programs
Finally, a UBI is often contrasted to traditional anti-poverty
programs by pointing out that a means-tested program creates
disincentives to earn money for the recipients, which are removed
in a true non-means-tested UBI.202 The EITC is a means-tested
program, but its benefits phase out with earnings much more
gradually than welfare programs imagined by UBI supporters, and
somewhat more gradually than most actual traditional
anti-poverty programs in the United States.203
As noted above, many UBI advocates believe that the
means-testing of traditional welfare programs function as a “cliff”
or a “soak up.”204 In reality, almost all programs in the United
States function as a phase-out, with benefits decreasing with
earnings at some rate less than 100%.205 So, it is very rarely the
case that a dollar of earnings results in a dollar loss of benefits.
However, because most programs are more sharply targeted at
poorer recipients than the EITC, most phase out more quickly than
the EITC.206 The EITC also phases out at a higher level of income
than most other anti-poverty programs,207 and so the disincentive
to work it creates has less effect on people in poverty (and more
effect on people at the upper end of the poverty line or just climbing
out of poverty).208
202. Cf. Fleischer & Hemel, supra note 20, at 1269 (“We agree that a UBI is
likely to be more efficient than the existing system of mean-tested in-kind
transfers.”).
203. Compare supra notes 59–86 and accompanying text (discussing UBI
supporters’ arguments in favor eliminating phase-outs in their entirety), with
DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES ON LOW-INCOME
HOUSEHOLDS 11–13 (1999) (describing the phase-out calculations for various
government anti-poverty programs).
204. Supra notes 51–52.
205. See, e.g., SHAVIRO, supra note 203, at 11–13 (describing the current
anti-poverty programs in the United States and their respective phase-outs).
206. See Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit,
and Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 405, 477–79 (1997) (analyzing the
phase-out rates of government anti-poverty programs).
207. See id. at 477–79 (stating the levels of income at which various
government anti-poverty programs have completely phased out).
208. See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of
phase-outs on the incentive to earn extra income).

124

26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 85 (2019)

As discussed above, a single parent of three children, for
example, has their EITC phased out between $18,660 and $49,194
of income.209 That phase-out creates an effective 21.06% marginal
tax rate on income within the phase-out range. That compares
favorably to most conceptions of a UBI that include a phase-out. 210
For example, Karl Widerquist, a UBI supporter, proposes a UBI
with a 50% phase-out starting at the very first dollar of income. 211
Thus, the EITC “means-testing” phase-out, while still potentially
having an adverse effect on recipients whose income puts them in
the phase-out range, is not nearly as extreme as is imagined by
some UBI advocates, and is also less extreme than most existing
traditional anti-poverty programs in the United States.
V. Four Proposals to Make the EITC More Like a UBI
The EITC in its current form provides moderate income
support to parents of minor children and has the strength of
creating work incentives for very low-income workers, but it is
criticized for (i) creating disincentives to work when the credit is
being “phased out;” (ii) creating perverse incentives with respect to
family structure and insufficiently supporting childless workers
and noncustodial parents; (iii) being hampered by administrative
complexity and delay; and (iv) being too small to eradicate poverty,
especially for childless workers. Happily, all four of these criticisms
could be addressed in an expanded EITC that functions more like
a UBI. This section discusses how.

209. See
Rev.
Proc.
2018-18,
2018-10
I.R.B.
395
(2018),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb18-10.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2019)
(providing inflation-adjusted EITC amounts for 2018) [https://perma.cc/E9AJ2424]
210. See MELISSA S. KEARNY & MAGNE MOGSTAD, UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME
(UBI) AS A POLICY RESPONSE TO CURRENT CHALLENGES 5–7 (2019) (discussing the
parameters for various UBI proposals and pilot programs).
211. Karl Widerquist, The Cost of Basic Income: Back-of-the-Envelope
Calculations,
BASIC
INCOME
STUD.
(2017),
https://works.bepress.com/widerquist/75
(last
visited
Oct.
23,
2019)
[https://perma.cc/FK72-ZMW2]; see also MURRAY, supra note 177, at 8 (proposing
a relatively gradual phase-out, starting with 10% and increasing by 4% with each
subsequent $5000, but capping at $60,000).
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A. Do Not Phase Out the Credit
The first proposal is perhaps the most radical, and (for that
reason?) has not been advocated in any of the existing proposals to
reform the EITC that I know of, but it would have some very
significant benefits. That reform is to remove the phase-out of the
benefit, so once a worker earned sufficient income to qualify for the
maximum credit, they would receive it no matter how high their
income got during the year. The primary benefit of such a structure
is that it would remove the concentrated work disincentives (the
“poverty trap”) caused by the phase-out of the benefit.212 It would
also dramatically simplify the administrative burden because the
government would not need to withdraw benefits as income rises
in the phase-out range.213 Once it was determined that a recipient
earned enough to qualify for the full credit, both the recipient and
the government could rely on the fact that the recipient qualified
for the full credit, without any concern that future earnings would
reduce the credit the recipient was due.214 This reform would make
further reforms described later much easier to implement,
especially distributing the benefit monthly instead of annually.
As discussed above, UBI advocates argue that a universal
benefit with no phase-out is superior to a means-tested benefit for
two primary reasons. First, removing the phase-out eradicates the
poverty trap by eliminating the work disincentives created by
phasing out the benefit.215 Second, removing the phase-out
dramatically simplifies the administration of a benefit program.216
212. See SHAVIRO, supra note 203, at 18 (describing the benefits of refraining
from phasing out a benefit program); see also Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg
& Peter R. Orsag, Reforming Tax Incentives into Uniform Refundable Tax Credits,
BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 1, 2006) (describing the benefits of refraining from phasing
out a benefit program).
213. See Batchfelder, Goldberg & Orsag, supra note 212 (discussing the
administrative costs of benefits).
214. See SHAVIRO, supra note 203, at 17 (comparing the phase-out structure
to a demogrant structure of distributing benefits).
215. See Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, supra note 14, at 549
(“For workers in the EITC phase-out range, the EITC creates an unambiguous
potential work disincentive.”).
216. See Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, supra note 14, at 566
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Both of these arguments in favor of a non-means-tested program
apply in the case of the EITC.217
With respect to the work disincentive created by the phase-out
of the EITC, first it is important to point out that the majority of
EITC claimants are in the phase-out range.218 Thus—at least
theoretically—the EITC should disincentivize work for many more
recipients than for those whose labor participation is
incentivized.219 In fact, for three quarters of all EITC recipients,
the credit serves as a disincentive to earn additional income
(because they are in the phase-out range) rather than an incentive,
although the magnitude of the disincentive is very hard to
assess.220 There is some consensus among economists doing
empirical work that the phase-in of the EITC increases labor
participation by single mothers, persuading some mothers who are
not earning money to work in the market economy.221 But the
(“[P]articular issues of EITC administration sometimes overlook the structural
features that create those problems and make those problems resistant to
reform.”), 589 (arguing for greater accessibility and cheaper administration).
217. Compare Fleischer & Hemel, supra note 20, at 1263–66 (discussing the
problems with phase-outs in a UBI program), with Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t
Make Work Pay, supra note 14, at 566 (discussing similar issues with phase-outs
in an EITC program).
218. See, e.g., Nada Eissa & Hilary Hoynes, Redistribution and Tax
Expenditures: The Earned Income Tax Credit 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 14307, 2008) (explaining that three quarters of people getting
the EITC are in the phase-out range).
219. See Chris Edwards & Veronique de Rugy, Earned Income Tax Credit:
Small Benefits, Large Costs, CATO INST. TAX & BUDGET BULL. NO. 73 (Oct. 14,
2015), https://www.cato.org/publications/tax-budget-bulletin/earned-income-taxcredit-small-benefits-large-costs (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (“[F]or most recipients
[the EITC] creates a disincentive to increase earnings.”) [https://perma.cc/7PJRXT7F]; see also Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, supra note 14, at
549 (“For workers in the EITC phase-out range, the EITC creates an
unambiguous potential work disincentive.”).
220. See, e.g., HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 7
[T]he reach of the EITC is roughly five times that of the old welfare
system, even when the welfare rolls reached their peak of roughly five
million households in 1993 and 1994. This is due to a very gradual
falloff in benefits . . . [so that] the EITC serves such a large percentage
of American households (about one in five) that it looks more like a
universal program than a program for the poor, at least from the point
of view of those at the bottom.
221. See Austin Nichols & Jesse Rothstein, The Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) 40 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21211, 2015)
(summarizing empirical research findings on labor participation and the EITC).
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economic literature attempting to assess the disincentive effect of
the phase-out range is much more complicated and does not result
in any clear findings.222 Therefore, it is not clear how substantial
the disincentive effect of the EITC phase-out is. However, it is
perfectly reasonable to assume that the EITC phase-out acts as a
disincentive to work as much as a 21.6% additional marginal
income tax rate would, if you assume that the phase-out and the
tax are equally salient to the worker.223
The administrative simplification that comes from removing
the EITC phase-out is not so impressive when discussed in
isolation. The EITC is already administered through the tax code,
and the information determining level of qualification is collected
on an income tax return. If there was no phase-out, taxpayers
would still need to collect the same information about income that
they do currently, since they would still need to file a full
income-tax return in order to claim the reformed EITC. The fact
that they could be confident throughout the year that additional
earnings would not disqualify them for EITC benefits might have
incentive effects but would not really simplify filing much. At best,
it might encourage some recipients to file, even if they might have
avoided filing currently, because they erroneously believed that
they earned too much to qualify. As discussed later, however, the
removal of the phase-out would have substantial simplification
effects if the program were reformed to permit periodic (as opposed
to annual) payments of the EITC benefits.224 That reform is much
more difficult if the EITC benefit phases out as income rises.
There are two primary objections to removing the phase-out of
the EITC. The first is that it would be too “costly” to pay the benefit
to so many people.225 The second is that it is unfair or inefficient to
make payments to people who do not need the money.226 On further
222. See id. at 43–47 (summarizing the economic literature on the effect of the
EITC phase-out on number of hours worked).
223. See id. at 45 (explaining that one theory about the difficulty in observing
an effect of the EITC on number of hours worked is that participants may have
difficulty in predicting how their work affects the amount of credit they receive).
224. See infra Part V.C.
225. See Shaviro, supra note 206, at 408 (“Thus, the EITC supposedly would
‘cost’ more if it were not phased out.”).
226. See SHAVIRO supra note 203, at 17–18 (entertaining a hypothetical
scenario where Bill Gates receives food stamps).
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examination, neither objection is as damning as it might initially
appear, although neither is trivial. First, it is hard to conceive of
the true cost because the majority of people will both be paying for
the benefit (presumably through some form of taxation) and
receiving it. If taxes go up by $5000 for someone who under the
reformed law receives a $5000 EITC payment that they previously
would not have received, then the new benefit has no “cost” to
them. So, in effect, there is no way to adequately assess the cost of
removing the phase-out of the EITC without calculating the
changes that would be made to the tax code to pay for the reform.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt any such
calculation.227 As for fairness and efficiency, the same response
applies: It is impossible to say whether providing a tax credit to
high-income people is fair unless we know how the tax code has
been changed to fund this payment.
B. Pay on an Individual Basis
Paying the EITC on an individual basis means paying the
same amount to an individual regardless of marriage status or
living arrangements. It does not mean that there can be no
payment on account of children, that children need to receive the
same amount per person as adults, or that the payment on account
of children cannot be made to a parent on the basis of custody. So,
reforming the EITC so that it is calculated on an individual basis
solves some of the criticisms that have been leveled against the
current EITC because of its treatment of family status and
composition, but not all of them.228 It is widely recognized that the
family status provisions are the source of the greatest complexity
in claiming and administering the EITC.229 As discussed above, the
227. I hope to assess possible funding sources and structures in a future work.
228. See Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, supra note 14, at 539–
41 (discussing problematic familial aspects of the EITC and stating that the EITC
has enjoyed support because of its assertion as a “pro-family” alternative).
229. See, e.g., HOLT, supra note 14, at 3
The greatest complications result from two specific sources: first, the
requirement that the child live with the claiming taxpayer for more
than half the year (and in the [United States]), and second, the rules
determining who may receive the credit when more than one taxpayer
is eligible to claim the same child.
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benefit claimed by any adult is dependent on whether they are the
custodial parent of any qualifying children.230 Adult qualification
depends on both marital status and factual questions about where
children lived and who lived with them over the course of the
year.231 If a child is assigned to the wrong parent, even
accidentally, both parents’ tax returns are erroneous (or even
potentially fraudulent).232 One powerful illustration of the fine line
that can separate even fraudulent returns from accurate ones is
the treatment of the children of unmarried parents. If both parents
live for over half the year with their children, the IRS permits
those parents to choose which parent should claim the children,
and there is nothing wrong with assigning the children to parents
in order to maximize the amount of credit received.233 However, if
one of the parents lives with the children for less than half the
year, then that parent cannot choose how to allocate the
children.234 Only the parent who lived with the child for half the
year is eligible to claim the credit.235 In fact, if the parents decide
to assign the child to the noncustodial parent, they could be guilty
of tax fraud (a criminal offense) and their mistaken impression
that the IRS permitted them to choose which parent could claim
the child would not be a defense.236 This complexity, and the
noncompliance it creates, has very real effects.237 It keeps some
230. See supra Part III.C (discussing how after three children, there is no
additional benefit to the parents so the structure creates an incentive for parents
of multiple children to remain unmarried and each claim at least one child to
maximize their benefits).
231. See supra Part III.C (“These and other family-structure issues create
potentially perverse incentives around marriage and cohabitation.”).
232. See
Basic
Qualifications,
IRS,
https://www.eitc.irs.gov/eitccentral/about-eitc/basic-qualifications/basic-qualifications (last updated Feb. 6,
2019) (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (describing the criteria for a qualifying child)
[https://perma.cc/8H8W-9SRY].
233. See Smith & Drumbl, supra note 113, at 14 (explaining flexibility parents
have when both meet the requirements to claim a child for EITC purposes).
234. See Basic Qualifications, supra note 232 (describing the criteria for a
qualifying child).
235. See Basic Qualifications, supra note 232 (describing the eligibility
requirements).
236. See I.R.S. Publication 501 (2018) (explaining when a child will be treated
as the qualifying child of the noncustodial parent).
237. See Consequences of Not Meeting Your Due Diligence Requirements, IRS,
https://www.eitc.irs.gov/tax-preparer-toolkit/preparer-due-diligence/consequence
s-of-failing-to-meet-your-due-diligence (last updated Apr. 1, 2019) (last visited
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people from receiving the credit even though they qualify for it. 238
It decreases confidence in the tax system and government.239 It
causes a misallocation of IRS enforcement resources.240 And for
some people, it increases suspicion that fraud and noncompliance
are endemic to the EITC program, decreasing the popular goodwill
towards it and reinforcing negative stereotypes about the poor and
near-poor.241 One could greatly reduce this complexity by crafting
the EITC as a credit for each adult, and then a credit for each child
that may be claimed by an adult on behalf of the child. For
example, one could imagine an EITC in which each adult received
a maximum credit of $519 (the 2018 maximum credit for childless
adults), and each child received a maximum credit of $2942 based
on the earnings of any adult with which they live.242 Under this
system, it would be irrelevant if adults are married to each other,
and it would take away the incentive to “split” children between
two parents.243 Of course, because the credit is the same for each
child, the new system removes the old system’s disincentive to
have multiple children (especially more than three).244
When combined with the removal of the phase-out, described
above, the change to an individual structure creates even more
substantial benefits. That is, because no person can earn too much
Oct. 23, 2019) (setting forth the penalties the IRS can assess for failure to comply
with due diligence requirements) [https://perma.cc/L2EN-QHBU].
238. See HOLT, supra note 14, at iii (“A quarter of EITC payments are
categorized as improper.”).
239. See HOLT supra note 14, at 19 (stating that government officials are
muddling through, not meaningfully addressing the challenges the IRS faces).
240. See HOLT, supra note 14, at 4 (stating that few additional resources were
provided for implementation of the EITC).
241. See HOLT, supra note 14, at 10 (stating that these programs are
frequently viewed with suspicion, not lessened by subpar compliance with EITC
rules).
242. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. § 3.05 (2018),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb18-10.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2019)
(announcing EITC Earned Income Amount and Phase-Out Thresholds for 2018)
[https://perma.cc/E9AJ-2424]. The current maximum credit for a family with one
child is $3461; therefore, if a parent receives $519 in the proposed system, the
child credit must be $2942 for parents to receive a larger benefit in the new
system.
243. See HOLT, supra note 14, at 17 (discussing how separate benefits removes
incentives for illegitimate behaviors and would result in improved compliance).
244. See I.R.C. § 32(b)(1) (2018) (providing no additional credit for families
with more than three children).
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to receive the credit anymore, there is no disincentive for a
low-income parent to get married to a higher-income person.
Finally, one could remove some of the incentives to have additional
children by adjusting the magnitude of the benefit between
children and adults to increase the credit per adult and decrease
the credit per child. This could be done in a way that no one was
worse off than they are under the current system. For example,
one could increase the adult credit to $3720, and decrease the child
credit to $1000 without anyone receiving a smaller credit than they
would under the current system.245 This proposed system would be
more expensive than the first proposal, but would do a better job
of supporting poor people without custody of children, would do an
equal job of supporting people with children, diminish the
dramatic difference in benefits between parents with children and
people without, and decrease the incentive to have multiple
children.246
C. Deliver in Cash Monthly
The third proposed modification of the EITC is for a
governmental agency to make direct monthly payments to each
recipient, rather than for recipients to receive the credit as a single
annual payment months after the end of the year in which the
recipient qualifies.247 This direct monthly payment has a number
of benefits (timing, simplicity, less cost to beneficiaries), but was
245. The maximum credit for a parent with two children is $5716; so, if the
parent with two children received $3720, they would need $1000 per child in order
for no one to receive less under the proposed plan than the current system. See
Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. § 3.05 (announcing EITC Earned Income
Amount and Phase-Out Thresholds for 2018).
246. There have been a number of recent proposals to expand EITC coverage
for noncustodial parents and for childless workers, including in former President
Obama’s 2016 Budget and by Paul Ryan, the former Republican Chair of the
House Ways and Means Committee. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 2016 (2015); Dylan Matthews, Paul Ryan’s Poverty Plan, VOX (Oct. 8, 2015),
https://www.vox.com/2014/7/24/18080430/paul-ryan-poverty (last visited Oct. 23,
2019) [https://perma.cc/8SWC-NNP2]; see also Nichols & Rothstein, supra note
221, at 52 (discussing theories for how to improve the EITC program).
247. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 52 (noting dissatisfaction
over the lump-sum payment).
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previously difficult or impossible to accomplish because of the
structure of the EITC program.248 Once the two changes proposed
above are made—removing the phase-out and making the benefit
individual—the barriers to a monthly direct payment are reduced
such that the proposal is no longer outlandish.249 In the UBI
literature, there is very little discussion of the differential benefit
of monthly as against annual distribution.250 However, in the EITC
literature, the issue is of constant interest, and heated debate. 251
That is because basic economic theory (and common sense)
suggests that if people are going to receive a certain sum of money,
they would be better off receiving it earlier and more often, rather
than in one largish chunk at the end of the year.252 But there is a
persistent theme in the EITC literature about the benefits of
annual lump-sum distribution.253 The structure of the EITC
program is an impediment to more frequent distribution, however,
248. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 52 (discussing the benefits
of monthly payments).
249. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 53 (discussing the drawbacks
of monthly payments).
250. While the difference between annual and more frequent payment is not
often discussed, the difference between a single lifetime payment (sometimes
called a “Basic Endowment”) and periodic payments (whether monthly or some
other period) is an important debate among UBI advocates. See, e.g., VAN PARIJS
& VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 29–31 (discussing payments in several large
installments as opposed to monthly distributions); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN ET
AL., REDESIGNING REDISTRIBUTION: BASIC INCOME AND STAKEHOLDER GRANTS AS
CORNERSTONES FOR AN EGALITARIAN CAPITALISM 159 (2006) (discussing the
arguments for basic endowments instead of monthly payments).
251. See, e.g., Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of
Tax-based Welfare Reform, supra note 14, at 561 (stating the EITC cannot get
money to taxpayers during the year when they need it); see MICHELLE L. DRUMBL,
IMPROVING TAX CREDITS FOR THE WORKING POOR (2019) (“Could EITC reform
include year-round delivery?”); see also STEVE HOLT, PERIODIC PAYMENT OF THE
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT REVISITED 4–5 (2015) (making a case for periodic
payments). See generally HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8 (discussing how
the EITC was meant to help lift people out of poverty). See Brian Galle & Manuel
Utset, Is Cap and Trade Fair to the Poor? Shortsighted Households and the
Timing of Consumption Taxes, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 33, 62 (2010) (discussing
the shortcomings of lump-sum payment regimes).
252. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 25 (“[A] lump-sum payment
has a smaller effect on the household’s utility than would a series of smaller
payments throughout the year.”).
253. See e.g., HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 9 (“The lump sum at
tax time can feel like an answer to a prayer.”).
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and has made it difficult to even conceive of how to reform the
program to facilitate monthly payments.254
A discontinued feature of the EITC illustrates how hard it is
to craft a good periodic payment system for the EITC without also
making other changes to the program.255 Between 1979 and 2010,
a taxpayer could receive an “advance” on their EITC in each
paycheck by filing a form with their employer, who would then
decrease the taxpayer’s withholding or make a positive
disbursement of advance EITC (“Advanced Earned Income Credit”
or “AEIC”).256 This program was intended to permit a taxpayer to
smooth receipt of the credit for all the reasons described above. 257
However, there was never a time that more than 2% of EITC
claimants chose to receive advance payments, which eventually
resulted in Congress eliminating the option in 2010.258 As Steve
Holt succinctly puts it, “For years, the principal objection to
developing a periodic payment option has been simple: The belief
that nobody (or hardly anyone) wants it.”259 This belief came
largely from the simple fact that take up of the AEIC is so low.260
But there are good reasons that an EITC recipient would
dislike the AEIC program, even if it would have been beneficial to
receive the money weekly.261 For example, low-income taxpayers
254. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 52 (stating that while there
is ambition to change the method of payment, there is a lack of workable proposals
on how to do this).
255. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 13 (describing the “Advance
EIC” which was offered from 1979 to 2010).
256. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 13 (describing the “Advance
EIC”).
257. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 13 (explaining the program).
258. See HOLT, supra note 251, at 5 (“[F]or many, the [small amount it boosted
each paycheck was] not worth the risk of potentially owing money back at the end
of the year.”).
259. See HOLT, supra note 251, at 15 (“Indeed the experience with the AEIC
creates a presumption that—whatever the merits for addressing financial need—
the intended beneficiaries are not interested in moving away from the single
lump-sum payment that provides very large refunds to many.”).
260. See HOLT, supra note 251, at 15 (describing how other countries’
programs can explain variable take-up rates in advance payment option
programs, with Canada’s “Working Income Tax Benefit” program having very low
take-up rates in periodic payment plans as compared to very high take-up (about
90 percent) in New Zealand’s “Working Family Tax Credits.”).
261. See HOLT, supra note 251, at 5 (discussing the reasons why the AEIC
never caught on).
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may have been (accurately) afraid that they would be required to
pay back some portion of what they received during the year.262
That is because the advance payments did not represent a final
determination about eligibility for the credit.263 It was just an
estimate, subject to recapture at the end of the year if the recipient
did not actually qualify for the amount they had received. In other
words, an AEIC recipient might be faced with a large mandatory
payment to the government at tax time. Because the amount of
EITC benefit is based on child custody, earnings, and sometimes
the earnings of multiple taxpayers, predicting how much will be
available at the beginning of the year is difficult, even for
taxpayers with relatively stable sources of income. For this reason,
any kind of “advance payment” system for the EITC has to account
for what happens if a child ends up living with a different parent
than predicted, or a parent moves out of the family home, or one
parent earns less than predicted, or more than predicted, or a
couple gets married or divorced during the year.264 Each of these
events could cause a taxpayer to receive less EITC than she
predicted. It makes sense that low-income taxpayers view the risk
of having to make a large lump-sum payment at tax time to be an
especially onerous event, and many who find themselves in that
situation experience it as an especially painful financial shock.265
262. See HOLT, supra note 251, at 5 (mentioning the risk of potentially owing
money back at the end of the year).
263. See HOLT, supra note 251, at 18 (stating that a key flaw of the AEIC was
that a single paycheck from a single employer is a poor indicator of household
eligibility).
264. See, e.g., Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 52 (explaining that the
annual lump-sum payment structure of the EITC prevents it from being as
effective as it might be, but that the authors “are not aware of workable proposals”
to institute an advance EITC program that would not suffer from the fatal flaw
of requiring some people to repay large sums at tax time).
265. See, e.g., HOLT, supra note 251, at 19 (“The greatest concerns expressed
by Colorado simulation participants were the inability to guess one’s income and
fear of the consequences of making a mistake.”); see also Greene, supra note 14,
at 561–62
[W]hen we asked families if they would be interested in a program like
the AEITC, they overwhelmingly told us that they would prefer to
receive the EITC as a lump sum—as they currently receive it [at least
partially because] they were afraid that if they took an advance on the
money, they would ultimately owe the IRS money at the end of the
year.
See also HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 72 (“The lump sum is also
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On the other hand, if the EITC were reformed to provide
benefits individually, rather than based on family status, it would
be easier to predict at least the range of potential benefits any
individual worker would be entitled to.266 Of course, there would
still need to be a determination of what responsible adult should
receive a distribution intended for the support of a child, but the
process could be simplified, and could be made to depend only on
information available prior to making a distribution, so there
would not be a need for the government to recapture payments that
were made because of inaccurate predictions. Even more
importantly, if the phase-out of the EITC were removed, then the
amount of EITC a taxpayer received would only depend on income
in the phase-in range. Once a taxpayer earned the threshold
amount, her EITC credit would be secure for the year. Since
significantly more taxpayers earn income in the phase-out range
than in the phase-in range, that would mean that many fewer
taxpayers would be uncertain about how much EITC they qualify
for.267 In other words, reforming the EITC so it was no longer
dependent on family status and no longer was lost as income rose
above a threshold amount would make it much easier to
administer a monthly distribution, since the need for the
government to recapture periodic payments made to taxpayers
who turned out not to be eligible simply because they incorrectly
predicted their family status or earned more than they expected. 268

popular because low-wage workers are strongly averse to a particular form of
financial risk: owing the IRS money at the end of the year.”); DRUMBL, supra note
251, at 2 (theorizing that taxpayers did not participate in the AEITC because “1)
taxpayers did not like having the employer act as an intermediary for something
so personal . . .; 2) taxpayers were . . . worried about owing something back at tax
time; and 3) . . . larger amounts of money are psychologically more meaningful.”).
There is also evidence that other factors led to the low participation rate, like poor
understanding of the AEIC program, the fact that it relied on employer
participation, administrative complexity, and the fact that most EITC recipients
have their tax returns processed by paid preparers, who have an incentive for the
recipients to receive as large a refund from their tax filing as possible.
266. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 52 (discussing potential
changes regarding non-custodial parents’ credits).
267. See Eissa & Hoynes, supra note 218, at 5 (explaining that three quarters
of people getting the EITC are in the flat or phase-out range).
268. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 52 (stating people have
suggested strategies to improve administration).
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Once these reforms are made, the program could be made even
simpler, if that was desired. For example, one could imagine a
program in which a taxpayer receives their first year of EITC “for
free” without any showing that they met the earnings requirement
(maybe on one’s eighteenth birthday). In that year, the taxpayer
would receive their individual benefit every month in an amount
equal to one twelfth of the maximum annual benefit.269 Each
person would receive a government-issued debit card in that year
(or they could opt to have their benefit direct-deposited into an
account at a financial institution).270 Then, for each subsequent
year, the taxpayer would receive benefits based on the prior year’s
earnings. 271 If the taxpayer earned the threshold amount in the
prior year, he or she would continue to receive one twelfth of the
maximum annual benefit every month. If the taxpayer earned less
than the threshold amount in the prior year, then he or she would
only earn an amount based on the prior year earnings. Of course,
that means that if the taxpayer earns less than the threshold
amount in some year, but then in a subsequent year earns more,
the EITC would not reflect the increased earnings until the year
following the year of increased earnings, much like it does under
the current system.272 On the other hand, in years in which
taxpayer’s income declined, the EITC benefit would not decline
until the following year, cushioning the taxpayer from the adverse
effect of the earnings decline, at least somewhat.
An EITC that was dependent only on whether an individual
had enough earnings to get the maximum credit in the prior year
would be infinitely easier to administer than the current EITC
(which is already quite easy). In fact, for some taxpayers, there
would be no need to even file a tax return to get it. For employees,
income could be verified directly from the Social Security
269. Proposals like these have been made by others. See, e.g., DRUMBL, supra
note 251 (proposing how to reform the EITC); see also Galle & Utsett, supra note
251, at 85 (setting out proposed reforms, including possibilities of government
intervention).
270. See Galle & Utsett, supra note 251, at 85 (“We suggest that self-directed
debit cards . . . can fill this need.”).
271. See Eissa & Hoynes, supra note 218, at 4 (“[C]urrent year EITC is tied
to prior year income . . . .”).
272. Cf. Eissa & Hoynes, supra note 218, at 4 (“Finally, current year EITC is
tied to prior year income, which may lead to inefficiencies given that employment
and living arrangements change frequently for the low-income population.”)
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Administration without the filing of a tax return.273 That way,
recipients could be saved the cost of tax preparation,274 the cost of
refund-anticipation loans,275 and at least some of the money that
low-income workers pay in credit-card and payday loans to
accelerate their receipt of the EITC currently.276
But of course, for taxpayers who both receive the credit and
owe tax, any program design that decouples receipt of the credit
from filing a tax return is likely to reduce tax compliance.277 One
of the benefits of the current EITC is that the fact that it is
embedded in the income tax system means that recipients have to
file taxes in order to receive the credit, and so the EITC creates
tax-return filing norms and practices among low-income workers
that may well persist as income rises for those workers.278 For that
reason, any program design that decouples receipt of the credit
from tax filing would have to reincorporate some mechanism to
create consequences for taxpayers who fail to file tax returns. For
example, receipt of any credit in the following year might be
dependent on adequately meeting one’s tax filing obligations in the
current year.
Once the reforms proposed above were made, it would be much
easier to administer the child component as a periodic cash
payment throughout the year. For example, the issue of which
273. See Hemel & Fleischer, supra note 67 (manuscript at 50–51) (proposing
the administration of a UBI through the Social Security Administration rather
than the IRS, which would be possible for a reformed EITC as well).
274. See HALPERN-MEEKIN ET. AL., supra note 8, at 69 (describing how the
largest provider of tax preparations services to low-income taxpayers is H&R
Block, which charges $192 for “the most basic return” and extra for each
additional schedule, including the one for the EITC).
275. See generally Andrew T. Hayashi, The Effects of Refund Anticipation
Loans on the Use of Paid Preparers and EITC Takeup (Va. Law & Econ., Working
Paper No. 2016-9, 2016); see also HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8 at 187
(describing an EITC recipient borrowing $1000 in December and paying $400 in
interest and fees, paid out of her tax refund, which is paid in February).
276. See Galle & Utset, supra note 251, at 87 (“Currently, many households
use refund anticipation loans to get early access to their EITC payment . . . .”).
277. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 12 (explaining that the
credit, when coupled with the filing of a tax return, acts as an incentive for one to
file taxes).
278. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 12 (noting that the
establishment of good tax habits early and in low-income workers correlates with
the habits continuing as their earnings rise.)
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adult can claim a child for EITC purposes is made more
complicated by the fact that some adults earn too much money to
qualify for the full credit, and so it is in the interests of the IRS to
make sure that no adult claims the benefit unless they really
deserve it. If a child lives seven months in the house of a relatively
high-earning parent (in the phase-out range or beyond), and only
five months in the house of the lower-earning parent, only the
higher-earning parent is eligible for the credit.279 If the
lower-earning parent claims it, more money is distributed from the
government, and the IRS must be concerned to prevent such
improper payments. If there is no phase-out of benefits, then each
parent can receive the full credit, and it simply doesn’t matter from
the government’s point of view which parent claims the credit (as
long as only one does). In that situation, it really would be
appropriate for there to be an administrative system that ensured
that only one parent received the credit but permitted qualifying
adults to decide amongst themselves which adult should receive
it.280
Therefore, the three reforms proposed so far—removing the
phase-out of benefits, paying the credit on an individual basis, and
paying the benefit monthly—all work together to make the EITC
simpler in all ways. It would be easy for the government to
administer it, easy for the recipient to claim it, easy for everyone
to understand who got it and in what amounts. People could plan
their lives around it, making whatever choices they thought were
best knowing that the benefit would be available to them so long
as they earned money. No other factors would be relevant, and no
conditions would be placed on the use of the money. Just like a
UBI.281
279. See Other EITC Issues, IRS, https://www.irs.gov /faqs/earned-incometax-credit/other-eitc-issues/other-eitc-issues (last visited Apr. 6, 2019) (explaining
that the IRS tiebreaker for unmarried parents who both claim the same
qualifying child is whichever parent the child has lived with longer during the tax
year) [https://perma.cc/4HRU-KBZS].
280. The benefit would differ between adults if either was in the phase-in
range, and therefore received less than the full benefit. But, as discussed
previously, far fewer recipients are in the phase-in range than the phase-out
range, and the simplification proposals offered in this Article would reduce that
number even more.
281. See Heller, supra note 3, at 65–66 (explaining that “[a] universal basic
income, or U.B.I., is a fixed income that every adult—rich or poor, working or
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D. Make It Bigger

The final proposed modification of the EITC is the one that is
conceptually the simplest, but probably the most difficult in
practice, and that is to simply make it bigger. With good reason,
UBI advocates are often vague about the exact magnitude of a
proposed UBI, but there is some general consensus at least about
the goals of a UBI, and these goals give some indication of an
appropriate size.282
In principle, a government fixes the basic income at a level to
allow subsistence but also to encourage enterprise and effort for
the enjoyment of more prosperity. In the U.S., its supporters
generally propose a figure somewhere around a thousand
dollars a month: enough to live on . . . but not nearly enough to
live on well.283

That figure—$1000 per month—corresponds pretty nicely to
the official poverty line for a single adult.284 And so, at the very
least the official federal measure of subsistence and the dominant
proposed size of a UBI are consistent with each other.285
Setting the magnitude of the UBI at a level to eliminate
poverty assumes that elimination of poverty is a central goal of the
program.286 There is no consensus in the United States that
redistributive policies on this level are a legitimate function of

idle—automatically receives from the government”).
282. See Heller, supra note 3, at 66 (explaining that there is a mixed reaction
to the UBI, but its supporters generally propose a figure that is “enough to live
on—somewhere in America, at least—but not nearly enough to live on well”).
283. Heller, supra note 3, at 66.
284. See 2019 POVERTY GUIDELINES, supra note 70 (stating that the “poverty
guideline” (sometimes called the “federal poverty level”) for a single adult in 2019
is $12,490 per year. For a family of four, the poverty guideline is $25,750).
285. The way the Poverty Guideline is calculated in the United States has
been widely criticized, with many critics arguing that it is out-of-date and
dramatically underestimates the amount of income necessary to avoid poverty.
See NICHOLAS EBERSTADT, THE POVERTY OF ‘THE POVERTY RATE’ (AEI Press 2008)
(arguing that the official poverty rate underestimates the amount of income
necessary to avoid poverty).
286. See About Basic Income, supra note 82 (noting that a basic income that,
in conjunction with other social services, is high enough “to eliminate material
poverty and enable the social and cultural participation of every individual” is
called a “full Basic Income”).
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government.287 That is at least one reason why some UBI proposals
are more modest and do not propose a UBI that would permit an
adult to survive even on a subsistence level.288 But even Charles
Murray proposes a UBI of $13,000 per year (with $3000 of it
mandatorily earmarked to purchase catastrophic health
insurance).289 He argues that he would prefer a government
without any redistributive policies to help the poor, disabled, or
elderly at all, but that libertarian ideal is “a solution that upward
of 90% of the population will dismiss.”290 Therefore, he proposes a
UBI at a level that “lowers the rate of involuntary poverty to zero
for everyone who has any capacity to work or any capacity to get
along with other people—which means just about everybody.”291
Of course, thinking about how big an EITC would have to be
to eradicate poverty is a complicated issue, because an EITC
provides no income to anyone without earnings from the market
economy. As a definitional matter, an EITC recipient has at least
some market earnings. So, how much market earnings does one
assume when one is claiming that the EITC is set to eradicate
poverty? Surely, it should be large enough to bring any person who
works at least 2000 hours at the federal minimum wage out of
poverty. That seems like the most parsimonious way of
interpreting the mandate. A person who works 2000 hours at the
287. See Amanda Novello, Universal Basic Income versus Jobs Guarantee—
Which
Serves
Workers
Better?,
THE
CENTURY
FOUNDATION,
https://tcf.org/content/commentary/universal-basic-income-versus-jobs-guarante
e-serves-workers-better/?agreed=1 (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (explaining that
there is controversy over the role of the government in implementing such a
redistributive program) [https://perma.cc/9SQ3-29X4].
288. See Thomas Straubhaar, On the Economics of a Universal Basic Income,
INTERECONOMICS,
https://archive.intereconomics.eu/year/2017/2/on-theeconomics-of-a-universal-basic-income/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (explaining
that the subsistence level is a political and not economic determination)
[https://perma.cc/49NF-6MEY].
289. See MURRAY, supra note 177, at 3 (proposing that “we should take all of
[money spent on income transfers] and give it back to the American people in cash
grants”).
290. See MURRAY, supra note 177, at 7 (proposing that the UBI should be
$13,000 per year for each person over 21, with at least $3000 of that required to
be spent on catastrophic health insurance). Murray believes that the UBI should
be accompanied by a constitutional amendment that requires the repeal of all
other social spending in order to ensure that redistributive spending does not
increase too much.
291. MURRAY, supra note 177, at 37.
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federal minimum wage of $7.25 earns $14,500, which is already
more than the federal poverty guideline for a one-person
household.292 That would suggest that if one’s goal was only
eradicating poverty for full-time workers, an EITC would only be
required for households with children. That is basically the
structure of the current EITC, although it still fails to bring all
households headed by a full-time worker out of poverty.293
But, presumably, one’s goal for a UBI would be more
expansive. For simplicity’s sake, let’s imagine a reformed EITC
whose goal was to bring all households headed by at least a
half-time worker out of poverty. A worker who worked 1000 hours
at federal minimum wage would earn $7250. If that worker lived
alone, he or she would need $5240 of EITC to reach the federal
poverty guideline for single-person households. That seems like a
reasonable place to start if one were proposing expanding the EITC
to bring it closer to reaching the goal of eradicating involuntary
poverty. For a worker to qualify for $5240 of credit with the first
$7250 of income, the “phase-in rate” would have to be at least 73%,
so for every dollar earned up to $7250, a worker receives
seventy-three cents of EITC. When the worker earned $7250, they
have received the maximum credit of $5293, which brings them
(barely) over the federal poverty guideline of $12,490.294
This discussion leaves out the correct level for a household
with children. If we assume that our goal is to bring a household
out of poverty when one adult worker works at least 1000 hours at
minimum wage, then we need to set the credit for each child at an
appropriate level. The federal poverty guidelines go up by $4420

292. See 2019 POVERTY GUIDELINES, supra note 70 (showing that the poverty
guideline for a single person household is $12,490).
293. Margot L. Crandall-Hollick, The Earned Income Tax Credit: An
Economic
Analysis,
CONG.
RES.
SERV.
1,
14
(2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44057.pdf (observing that married and unmarried
childless workers with pre-tax income below the poverty line have their income
remain under the poverty line even after adding the EITC)
[https://perma.cc/JYU9-CNMW].
294. I personally prefer an EITC set at 100% of earnings up to $6000, so a
person earning $6000 would receive an EITC benefit of $6000 a year, or $500 a
month. Chris Hughes proposes a benefit of $500 a month, which he argues should
be provided through an “expanded and modernized EITC.” HUGHES, supra note
44, at 167.
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for each additional member of a household after the first.295
Therefore, the child maximum credit must be at least $4420 if the
adult maximum credit is $5293.296 So, an adult worker, for each
child they have, would get an additional credit of sixty-one cents
for every dollar earned. An adult with custody of one child would
get $1.34 for every dollar earned up to $7250; an adult with custody
of two children would get $1.95 for every dollar earned up to $7250;
etc. Of course, the program could move the child benefit out of the
EITC so earning was irrelevant—into a child tax credit, for
example, that every parent gets no matter how much they earn. 297
Similarly, if the adult credit were increased, the child credit could
be decreased slightly, but that might result in very large families
still falling below the federal poverty line. Perhaps it would make
sense to provide levels that brings any family with three or fewer
children above the poverty line, and not worry about ensuring that
every single family with one parent working 1000 hours still
exceeds the poverty line.298
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that an EITC (unlike
some conceptions of a UBI) could never replace most other
conditional transfer programs. Anyone who is unable to work in
the market economy cannot benefit from the EITC, and so unless
the government is to forsake them completely, other programs
must still exist. For example, the various programs under the
295. 2019 POVERTY GUIDELINES, supra note 70.
296. 2019 POVERTY GUIDELINES, supra note 70.
297. See Gil Charney, The New Child Tax Credit, H & R BLOCK (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://www.hrblock.com/tax-center/irs/tax-reform/new-child-tax-credit/
(last
visited Oct. 23, 2019) (stating that the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act expanded the Child
Tax Cut, so starting in 2018, the child tax credit provides $2000 per child
(although the refundable portion is smaller, there is a work requirement for the
refundable portion, and the credit phases out for high-income taxpayers)
[https://perma.cc/TRU6-C6DJ].
298. As described above, my personal preference would be to have per-adult
benefit of $6000 per year, and then to take care of children through an expanded
child tax credit without a work requirement. In order for a one-child household to
avoid poverty, the per-child benefit would have to be $3660, so a person with
custody of one child gets $3660 no matter how much they earn, and an additional
$6000 so long as they earn at least $6000. If they work 1,000 hours at $7.25, they
have $7250 of market income, $6000 of individual benefit and $3660 of child tax
credit, for a total of $16,910 (exactly the federal poverty guideline of $16,910 for
a family of two). Unfortunately, this benefit structure would not be enough to
ensure that a single parent of two or more children had income above the poverty
guideline.
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purview of the Social Security Administration: Programs for the
disabled,299 elderly,300 and others would still need to continue, since
those people cannot work in the market economy. Similarly, it
would probably be necessary to continue SNAP301 and TANF,302
since it is inappropriate to cease to provide any support for families
with children who are unable to find work despite diligent effort. 303
These programs might be able to be reduced if the EITC was
expanded but could not be completely abandoned.
Like the three other EITC reform proposals made in this
Article—to remove the phase-out, to remove the family-status
provisions, and to pay the benefit monthly—this proposal to
expand the EITC so it almost eradicates poverty in all workers able
to work at least 1000 hours per year is not a necessary component
of any reform effort.304 The EITC would be improved if any one of
the reform proposals was enacted without the others, and none is
necessary for its improvement. It is only if the goal of EITC reform
is to get closer to eradicating poverty that its expansion is
necessary. But that is a worthy goal.

299. See
Disability—How
You
Qualify,
SOC. SECURITY ADMIN.
https://www.ssa.gov/planners/disability/qualify.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2019)
(explaining that to qualify for SSDI one must have been unable to work for a year
due to disability) [https://perma.cc/3H23-KCEA].
300. See
Who
Is
Eligible
for
Social
Security,
AARP,
https://www.aarp.org/retirement/social-security/questions-answers/eligible-for-s
ocial-security.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (explaining that one must be retired
to qualify for retirement benefits) [https://perma.cc/2JFT-K4QQ].
301. See Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), BENEFITS.GOV,
https://www.benefits.gov/benefit/361 (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (showing that
only
certain
low-income
families
qualify
for
SNAP
benefits)
[https://perma.cc/82XL-3ZFW].
302. See e.g., Texas Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF),
BENEFITS.GOV, https://www.benefits.gov/benefit/1679 (last visited Oct. 23, 2019)
(explaining that only certain families with needy children qualify)
[https://perma.cc/TGN6-PBUG].
303. See Lipman, supra note 14, at 1176–79 (detailing the effects of childhood
poverty and how Congress has implemented social benefit policies using the
federal income tax system).
304. See discussion supra Parts V.A–C.
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VI. Conclusion

A universal basic income is in many ways a radical idea, and
there are many reasonable people who are, and are likely to
remain, unconvinced of the net benefits of such a significant
overhaul of government transfer programs. That being said,
proponents of a UBI are not wrong that many of a UBI’s
components are good policy. There are benefits to providing
transfers in cash (or the equivalent on a debit card), to minimizing
complicated and hard-to-verify qualifications for participation, to
reducing or eliminating the “marginal tax rate” caused by the
(too-steep) phase-out of benefits, to making each adult individually
qualified rather than qualifications depending on family (and
especially marital) status, and to providing the transfers regularly
throughout the year when struggling people need them most.
There are also benefits that may accrue from delinking
anti-poverty transfers from paid work or attempts to get employed,
although there are perceived (and possibly real) detriments to such
an approach as well. This Article has attempted to provide a more
modest way forward than trying to implement a true UBI all at
once. Instead, it has proposed a series of reforms of the Earned
Income Tax Credit, each of which makes the EITC more
“UBI-like.” Completely avoiding the discussion at the heart of a
UBI—the delinking of transfers from labor—this Article has
proposed that the EITC could be (i) paid to all without a phase-out,
(ii) paid individually rather than based on family status, (iii)
delivered monthly rather than annually, and (iv) expanded so it is
large enough to eradicate poverty for any worker who can work at
least half time at a job that pays at least the federal minimum
wage. These reforms would still leave many poor people out: The
disabled, elderly, full-time unpaid caregivers, and anyone else
unable to secure employment for at least half the year would still
be without assistance, and so the programs that serve those people
would need to continue to operate. But for the rest of us, an
expanded reformed EITC could provide a universal safety net that
could capture many of the benefits of a UBI without the need to
invent a bold new system seemingly out of nothing. It is plausible
that modest half steps are less politically realistic than
revolutionary action. But it is surely worthwhile to consider the
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possibility that benefits can be achieved without the radically new,
even one modest step at a time.

